Indian Policy Towards Nepal: Recent Trends by Kulshreatha, Alka
INDIAN POLICY TOWARDS 
NEPAL: RECENT TRENDS 
DtSSEftTATION SUSMITTeO FOU THE DEGREE OF 




DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 




Department of Polit ical Science 
AlJfjait' M'-")l'rn Uri'v/er-Jty 
AliQarli 
_,, '^Pubtic : 26720 
^^""^ [univ. : 8266 
Q.,jp,, December 2, 1992 
This Is to certify that Alka 
Kulshrestha has completed her research on 
"Indian Policy Towards Nepal : Recent Trends" 
under my supervision. This dissertation, in 
my opinion* is suitable for sulnnisslon for 
the award of M.Phil degree. 
;^ kr^  
M.A. Kishor'e ^^U H 
C O N T E N T S 
PREFACE . • . Hi 
Hap of India And Nepal ••• Iv - v 
CHAPTER » I t THE FOUNDATION AND EVOLUTION OP 
DHDIA'S POLICY TQWATOS NEPAL •., 1 
A, t Political-cultural Ties Between 
India and Nepal 
B. t Domestic conditions In Nepal and 
its Implications on India's polic)r 
C, I India's Role in Nepal's Domestic 
Affairs 
D, I tlie China Factor in India's Policy 
Towards Nepal 
E. t Implications of Sino-Indian conflict 
on India's Policy Towards Nepal. 
F. t Nepal's Proposal of Zone of Peace 
CHAPTER -II I JNDO NEPAL ECONOMIC TIES ... 22 
A. I India's Policy To%«ards Agreements 
B. : Trade Treaty of 1960 
C. X the Impact of Regional Political 
Environment 
D. t India's Policy in the Eighties 
CHAPTER - Hit THE BOLITICAL^ECONOMIC AND STRATEGIC 
FACTORS IN THE FORMATION OP INDIA'S 
POLICY TOWARDS NEPAL ... 49 
A. t Impact of Aid 
B. s P o l i t i c a l Psyche 
C. t SoutJh f.el&n Aft8ocl&t.lon f o r 
Regional Cooperation 
D. I Impl icat ion on Nepa l ' s P o l i c y 
E. J Other Factors 
F. t Trip of Terms After Expiry of 
Treaty on 23-3-89, 
G. t Terminal of Treaty 
H. : Indo-Nepal Did To Mend Fences 
I, : Restoration of status quo 
J, : New Phase in Indo Nepal Relations 
CONCLUSION .... 71 
APPENDIX .... 77 
BIBLIOGRAPlff .... 9^ 
i. 
A couple of sunsners agp, in a historic election, 
the Mepalese. a£ter reeling under the oppressive panchayat 
syatein for the past 32 years, vested their hopes in 
G.P, Koirala's democratic government to steer Nepal away 
from the traumatic past and lead it towards a democratic 
destiny. The Nepalese leaders vowed to fight for an indepen-
dent state which could be subordinated to neither external 
powers nor to privileged citizenry within Nepal, today, is 
on the path to d«naocracy, rule of law and economic stability. 
Just as Eastern Europe is. 
The domestic changes in Nepal, the recent fluctuations 
in Indo-Mepal relations and further fast changing strategic 
equations in the world created a necessity to assess India's 
role in this new world order in general and in this region 
In particular. India*s relations with Nepal, in this respect, 
have paramount importance. For, Nepal, a predominantly Hindu 
State, is bounded on the north by Tibet, on the east by 
Sikkim and West Bengal, on the south and west by Bihar and 
uttar Pradesh. India has traditionally contributed a consi-
derable amount to Nepalese economy. Nepal's major trading 
partner is India. Nepal is also a member of the South Asian 
Association for Regional cooperation (SAARC) having permanent 
secretariat in Kathmandu. 
11. 
'Zhe present/study covers the politico-economic and 
security dimensions o£ India with Nepal In the perspective 
o£ global politics. It Is also Intended to analyse how far 
India's policy Initiatives In the economic development of 
Nepal and Its own have been fruitful. Bilateral understanding 
In respect of regional and global compulsions are also to 
be viewed. 
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THE FOUNDATION AND EVOLUTION OF INDIAN POLICY 
TOWARPri NRPAL 
THE FOUNDATION AND EVOLUTION OF INDIA![S$ POLICY 
TOWARDS NT?PAL 
A. Political-Cultural Ties Between India and Nepal 
The social, economic, political anri historical bindlnq 
between India and Nepal are deeply familiar. The cultural 
patterns in India and Nepal are hardly indistinguishable, 
Hinduism, the faith of the majority of the people in India, 
is the dominant religion in Nepal, Gorkhali, the official 
language of Nepal is a consonant of Sanskrit. 
Similarly, the economies of the two countries are 
inextricably interwoven, Gorkhas are serving in the Indian 
Army. They come to India in search of their livelihood and 
a large number of them have settled in India. 
Nepal has also an important place in Indian mythologv. 
There are allusions to the Kingdom in puranas. Sita is beli-
eved to have been bom in Janakpur in Nepal. Lord Budha was 
bom in Lumbhini, a place in Tarai, Ashoka is said to have 
visited the valley to propogate Budhism and his daughter 
Chairumati is said to have married a Nepali prince. In fact 
many Indian Kings ruled Nepal and same Nepalese kings ruled 
over a large part of India. 
The British India relations with Nepal were based 
on the Treaty of Sugauli, which Nepal had to sign after 
the war of 1814-16. It was however, a contact between two 
sovereign States, The terms and conditions of the treaty 
also do not reflect that Nepal had surrendered her sovereignty 
1, Other languages and dialects spoken and understood in 
Nepal have close resemblance to Indian languages, Gorkhali 
is written in Devnagri script, Hindi, obviously, is 
Universally understood in Nepal, 
't 
to the Britishers. The Nepalese never allowed the British 
to interfere in their domestic affairs and the British 
government regarded Hepal an independent State. 
After Independence the Indian Government constantly 
received gestures of friendship from Nepal. Nepal was 
conscious that practically no government in Nepal could 
2 
survive without India's support. 
Another treaty was ^igned on 21 December 1923 at 
Sugauli between Nepal and British India and the former 
finally obtained an "unequivocal" recognition of its inde-
I>endence. In the first clause both Governments agreed 
"mutually to acknowledge and respect each other's indepen-
dence, both internal and external". The scope of Nepal's 
independence however was limited somewhat by the third 
clause which obligated each other "to exert its good offices" 
to remove cause of "any serious friction or misunderstanding 
with neighbouring states whose frontiers adjoin theirs," 
Although defined in terms of mutual obligation, 
infact this meant that Nepal would continue to "consult" 
the Government of India on relations with Tibet, Sikkim, 
Bhutan and China, clause V provided that Nepal gain the 
right to import arms and ammunition without previous Govern-
ment of India approval so long as the intentions of the 
Nepal Government are friendly and that there is no Immediate 
w4l£h:in danger to India from such importations". Here again 
however, this right was limited in practice, if not in 
theory. 
1. Ramakant, Indo^-Nepalese Relations. 1816 to 1877 
(Delhi. 1 9 ^ ) , p.5. 
2. This feeling had been reflected in all formal and 
informal policy pronouncements of the Ranas. 
3. Leo E. Rose, Nepal Strategy for Survival, London,1971, 
pp. 171-52. 
3 
This was evident from the treaty of sugaulKlSlS). 
The Nepal government therefore signed a "Standstill 
Agreement" with India In 1947 and agreed to continue the 
spirit of British India Nepal relations. This was followed 
by a tripartite agreement on August 9, 1947. By this agree-
ment^, Nepal agreed to continue to allow recruitment of 
2 
Gorkhas for the armed forces of India and Great Britain. 
In return for the recruiting facilities the government of 
India managed to fulfil Nepal's military needs regarding 
defence production, army transport planes civil supplies 
and training facilities. After this brief initial phase, 
the India's policy towards Nepal and subsequent Indo-
Nepalese relations could be understood by the treaties 
which were signed by both the countries and were being 
reformed time to time in later years. 
The two very Important treaties were conducted on 
31 July 1950 after prolonged negotiations. 
These two treaties <1) a Treaty of Peace and Friendship 
and (2) a Treaty of Trade and Conmerce, are still considered 
the cornerstone of Indo-4lepalese relations. The first treaty 
was almost a defence pact between the two countries. The 
Second Treaty provided for India's directions and guidance 
in matters of trade and commerce between the two countries. 
1. The practlve of recruitment of Gorkhas had been started 
by the British long back. For details, see Ashad Hussain. 
British India's Relations with The Kingdom of Nepal, 
1857-1947. Allen and Unwin, London, 1970, pp. 234-254. 
2. Nepalese forces activity assisted India in the Kashmir 
and Hyderabad military compaigns in 1947-48. See The 
Hindu, Madras, February 16, 1950. 
3. S.D, Muni, Foreign Policy of Nepal, Delhi, 1973, p. 20. 
India, in fact had very high stakes in the security 
and defence of Nepal. Such strategic considerations were 
repeatedly emphasised by Prime Minister Nehru. These consi-
derations led India to secure Nepal's cooperation and parti-
cipation in coiMQon defence and security matters. The Treaty 
of Peace and Friendship of 1950 provided the basic and legal 
framework for the unified measures for mutual security and 
defence between India and Nepal. Following the treaty» for 
instance, the checkposts were established along Nepal's 
northern border. The Crovernroent of India also sent a military 
mission to Nepal to assist the host Government in the "Training 
2 
and re«-organisation of the Nepalese Army." 
Thus, India's policy has always been receptive to 
Nepal's security needs. It was believed at New Delhi that 
it could be accomplished only if Nepal became a strong, 
progressive and stable political unit. The Indian Government, 
therefore, advocated a compromise between the Ranas and the 
"revolutionaries". India adopted, thus, the "middle-way" 
policy. It was considered to be b4 
vital Security Interests in Nepal. 
est suited to the India's 
B. DoiBe8t.;|^ c Conditions in Nepal And Its Implications on India's 
Policy 
It was the time when domestic conditions in Nepal 
4 
were fast deteriorating. The Ranas were facing growing 
disaffection and opposition by the Nepali Congress. However, 
^' ?;?^o!i^^J^ The Chinese Betrayal , New Delhi, 1971, pp. 
^' ?nrf<^f;;/!S?^* Documents on Nepal's Relations with 
StrfL^^f'^^'/^r ^^^^' iy'^rp. 3V, Leo E. Rose. Nepal Strategy of Survival, California, 1971, p. 197 ' ^ 
3. Tlie term used by Miuii; See S.D. Muni; 
4. Permanand, The Nepali Congress In Exile, Delhi, 1978.p.5. 
there were the views on extreme side within the Indian 
Oovernment regarding political developments in Nepal. 
sardar Patel, for instance, urged that Indian forces be 
sent to Nepal to end the in human and cruel role played by 
Nepalese regime. Nehru assumed that since the situation 
in Nepal had been disturbed, "a return to the old order 
2 
will not bring peace and stability in Nepal. 
The situation In Nepal, therefore, forced Indian 
foreign policy into a dilemma. The Indian tilt could have 
minus-plus implications. The Indian decision-makers did not 
like Interference in Nepal. Any substantial support to the 
revolutionaries, felt the Indian policy makers, would cer-
tainly have caused total failure of administrative machinery 
of the Kingdom. India wanted democratic processes to be 
initiated In Nepal but could not permit uprooting of the 
existing order. The central theme of India's ao-called 
"mlddleway" policy was that there should be peaceful and 
gradual democratlsatlon by evolving a workable compromise 
between the Ranas and the popular forces. 
Broadly speaking, India's policy towards Nepal at 
that time was based on three main objectives: Firstly, to 
keep Nepal away from cold war tensions, secondly, to stren-
gthen her northern border against Communist China's expan-
sionist policy in Tibet, and lastly, to help Nepal achieve 
political and economic stability which could have been her 
4 
best guarantee against foreign intervention in Nepal. 
Thus, Insplte of non-interference, India played a 
key role in the process of relinguishment in Nepal, India 
1, Grishma Bahadur Devkola, Nepal Ka Rajnitik Darpan, 
Kathmandu, 1960, p. 37, quoted by Muni. 
2. Nehru's speech in Lok Sabha. 
3, Anlrudha Gupta, Politics in Nepal : A Study of Post Rans 
Political Development and Party Politics. Bombay.1964.p.41 
4. Ibid, p. 41. 
1'» 
extended support to King Tribhuwan, The Indian Government, 
in fact, had arranged King Tribhuwan*s excape, refused to 
recognise his dethronement and made it difficult even for 
the United Kingdom and United States to do so. It consis-
tently believed that the King was by no means a traditional 
monarch. He was favourably disposed towards modem ideas 
of freedom, progress and equality. He was himself regarded 
a compromise between change and status-quo. 
India*a key role to the ••Middleway" policy decisi-
vely influenced internal politics. It led to the "Delhi 
Settlement" of January 1, 1951 in which the Ranas agreed 
to amend their initial proposals for constitutional reforms 
according to the "friendly suggestions** of the Government 
of India. A week later, Mohan Shansher announced measures 
to set the people on the road of orderly progress towards 
the goal of a free and independent democracy. Following 
the spirit of Delhi Settlement, the King of Nepal formed a 
cabinet on February 18, 1951. Thus this disturbing {^ase in 
Nepali politics ended in a compromise. Simultaneously, it 
was the beginning of the era of "special relationship" 
between India and Nepal. 
Ttie era constituted an important initial phase in 
the evolution of India's foreign policy towards Nepal. The 
genesis and growth of the doctorine of "special relations" 
need brief attention before more substantial and recent 
4 
aspects of India's p>olicy are taken up for analysis. 
1. For details see T^e Hindu. November 11, 1950/ The 
Statesman. November 12 and 14, 1950. 
2. S.D.Muni, "Foreign Policy of Nepal, Delhi, p. 26. 
3. Ibid., p. 26. 
4. For India the period frc»n the return of King Tribhuwan 
in February 1951 to his death on March 31, 1955 stands 
out for -very close relations with Nepal. 
Obviously, India played a decisive role in bringing 
about the fall o£ Ranas and in the consequent ascendence 
to {Mbwer o£ the new Nepali elite. The King and the party 
leaders, therefore, looked towards Indian Government and 
leaders with respect and admiration for the latter'a rich 
political experience and democratic ideals and sought 
inspiration and guidance from them. 
The new leadership, in addition, in Nepal had 
problems o^ political stability of law and order, of having 
an efficient administration which could respond to growing 
demands of society of constitutional economic development 
and of international relations. Nepal had little political 
experience; India extended overall assistance. Ttiis led to 
extensive cooperation between the two Governments in various 
fields i.e. political, economic, cultural and administrative. 
The special relations made Nepal dependent in India. 
C. India*s Role In Nepal's Domestic Affairs 
India exercised immense and decisive influence over 
the Government of Nepal and Indian leaders were often called 
upon to resolve conflicts in the Nepali politics. In fact 
there were wide differences between the King, the Ranas and 
the Nepali Congress, They were ideologically and politically 
1 2 
rivals. The cabinet crisis was resolved by India, after 
a series of negotiations among the concerned leaders. The 
3 
Nepali cabinet was reshuffled primarily on India's advice. 
1. The Hindu, February 20, 1951. 
2. The Hindu, May 8 and 9, 1951 
3. The Hindu, May 17, 1951. 
Nehru visited Kathmandu in the first week of June, 19 51. 
However the resolution was short-lived. The reshuffled 
cabinet collapsed in November, 1951 after the domestic 
clashes. But the practice of consultation with the Indian 
Govenunent regarding the Nepalese cablnt matters continued 
even after the fall of Rana congress coalition* 
The appointment of M.P. Koirala as the new Prime 
Minister in November 1951^ for Instance, was believed to 
have been minlpulated by the Indian Ambassador in Kathmandu, 
C.P.N. Singh. 
To bring a permanent solution of the border crossing 
by the criminals on either side, India provided all facili-
ties to Nepalese police personnel and entered into the 
Treaty of Ex tradition in October 1953. 
Thus, India actively assisted Nepal in the reorgani-
sation of the administrative structure of Nepal. An Indian 
team of experts visited Nepal in January 1952. A three 
member commission under M.M. Buch, an ICS officer, was. 
appointed by the Indian Government to submit a report on 
3 
administrative reorganisation in Nepal. 
In fact strategic consideration for the safety of 
both Nepal and India necessitated the building up of a 
viable system of defence In the Kingdom. India had, there-
fore, of necessity to assist the Nepalese authorities in 
stabilising the economic situation of Nepal. 
1, Bhuwanlal Joshi and Leo E.Rose, Democratic ^'^"oyatives 
in Nepal, Berkeley, Los Angeles, 1966, pp. 66-100, Also 
see Anlrudha Gupta, Politics in Nepal, Allied Publishers, 
Bonibay, 1964, p, 64, 171-174, The Hindu, December 8, 
1952; In a bitter compalgn against India ^r. Robert 
Trunball reported that the real ruler of Nepal today is 
the Indian Ambassador Mr. C.P.N. Singh, The New York 
Times, December 21, 1951. 
2, Muni, op. cit, p. 76. 
3, India, Parliamentary Debetes, LoX Sabha, May 16 to 18, 
1952, Press Note, Ministry of External Affairs, Appendix 
I, No. 27, p. 58. 
The law and order situation In Nepal became critical 
after the "Delhi settlement". The revolutionaries led by 
Dr. K.I. Singh refused to abide by the Delhi Settlement 
which they described as the "betrayal of the revolution". 
The indulged in terrorist activities which paralyzed 
economic life in the Tarai and created panic among the 
inhabitants. Ihese activities also effected the adiacent 
Indian villages* Since the border was open and unguarded. 
On the request of Nepalese government,The Indian troops o£ 
U.P. Armed constabulary undertook join oper?»tions with the 
Nepal on her request to conteract lawlessness in Nepal 
Tarai, A part of these troops remained in this area to 
2 
stabilise peace in the area. Then to find a permanent 
solution of the border crossing by the criminals on either 
side. India also agreed to finance the development and 
improvement of the Gaucher airport in Kathmandu and to 
construct Tribhuwan Rajpath - a highway Joining Kathmandu 
4 
with an Gaucher Indian border village Raxaul. It was aimed 
at improving Nepali means of communication with India so 
that she could receive emergency assistance from India. 
India's policy suffered from the failure of the 
Nepalese leaders to give the country a stable administration 
during this period. A section of the Nepali congress expressed 
the view that Nepalees were educated enough and were capable 
of initiating reforms by themselves to improve the admini-
stration. In May 1954, an Indian Parliamentary delegation 
1. The Hindu, February 23, 1951. 
2. India, Parliamentary Debtee. Part I.Vol. VII, No. 35, 
May 14, 1951, Cols 42 36-38. 
3. The Hindu, July 20, 1953; also see. The Statesman, 
July 20, 1953. 
4. S.D. Muni# op. cit., p. 188. 
5. The Tiroes of India, New Delhi, March 16, 1953. 
(1 
had to face hostile crowds during Its visit to Nepal on 
a goodwill mission. 
Ttie nature of India's role throughout this uneasy 
period of Internal political, revalrles, had been strictly 
2 
advisory. India's policy In Nepal was, some observers 
felt, for sometime suffered from lack of consistency. The 
t%ro statements made by Nehru In the Indian Parliament on 
December 6 and 9, 1950* defining India's policy in Nepal 
were quoted In favour of auch impressions. Nehru said on 
December 6t "Nepal was an Independent country when India 
was under British rule, but strictly speaking, her indepen-
dence was only formal. "The test of the independenr-e of a 
country Is that it should be able to have relations with 
other countries without endangering that Independence. 
In an another statement, with some reservations, he said t 
"My description about the Independence of Nepal, I 
am told, was perhaps not quite correct. I think It was 
perfectly correct, but I have been somewhat misunderstood 
the Independence of a country Is ultimately 
Judged by the foreign relations of that country. A country 
can be completely Independent as Nepal has been, but, if 
it has no foreign relations, it does'nt come in the 
definition of nations in the way an Independent country 
does. during the last years or more, although 
Nex>al was an Independent country, she had no foreign 
relations except through the British in India. Ttiat was 
her only window on the outside world I was not 
hinting that the Government of India prevented her form 
having independent foreign relations but rather she herself 
did'nt think it necessary or desirable or feasible to 
develop these international contacts.*** 
1. The Times of India, New Delhi, May 20, 1954; also see, 
Amrlt Bazar Patrika, May 1, 1953 
2. The Times of India. New Delhi, June 21, 1954; see, the 
statement of Sir Olrja Shanker Bajpai, Secretary of the 
External Affairs Ministry, New Delhi, In Indian Year 
Book of International Affairs, Madras, 19511 
3. Jawahar Lai Nehru's Speeches. The Publlcatlcxis Division, 
Ministry of infonnation and Broadcasting, New Delhi, p.175 
4. Ibid.. p. 188 
11 
The policy of friendship with India was in trouble 
in Nepal after the death of King Tribhuwan. His death, the 
installation of Prince Mahendra as the new King and the 
resignation of M.P. Koirala marked the opening of a new 
era in Indo^fepalese relations* The years 1955 and 1956 
highlighted, in addition, the arrival of China in Nepal 
through agreements on diplomatic relations. India's policy 
towards China had an important bearing on developments in 
Nepal at that time. It applies even today. 
D. The.China Factor in India's Policy Towards Nepal 
King Mahendra had brought in the clement of nationa-
lism to keep up his hold on state power. He, as a crown 
prince, had demonstrated a self-assertive character anfl an 
inclinatJi3n to chooise pragmatic foreign policy objectives. 
Significantly, King Mahendra tried to exploit sino-
Indian rift in Nepal's potrer China wanted increased involve-
ment in Nepal. The King promised greater opportunity to 
China to play a role In the Kingdom, arguing that Nepal has 
2 
little economic or social contacts with China. Notably, 
the Government of India welcomed the policy initiatives of 
King Mahendra. Nehru appreciated the establishment of 
diploaatic relation between Nepal and China. 
Nepal formally recognised the communist regime in 
China on July 31, 1955 and established friendly relations 
1. Bhuwan Lai Joshi & Leo E. Rose, op. cit., p. 179. 
2. See Editorial India and Nepal in The Hindustan Times, 
Nov 5, 1955; and Editorial Time to Act' in The Times 
of India, New Delhi, Feb 21, 1955. 
3. See Lok Sabha Debates. Vol. IV, No. 16, August 16, 
1955 col. 3702 
i.l 
on the basis of Panchsheel. An agreement on Trade and 
Intercourse between Nepal and China was signed at Kathroandu 
on September 20, 1956. Nepal, in addition, recognised 
China's new position in Tibet (as India had done) through 
the Agreement and thus surrendered its claims and rights 
in Tibet.^ 
China, in return, gave substantial economic assistance 
to Nepal. China gained the Kathmandu Kodari Road in the 
process and acquired a permanent strategic advantage. Signi-
ficantly, China was also apprehensive of Indian activities 
in Nepal, Bhutan and the North East Frontier Aqency. Tibet 
was in china's regional security zone, vital for her South 
3 
Asian povrer status. 
Notably, Nehru signed an agreement with China that 
recognised the Tibet Region of China, removed Indian military 
personnel frcxn Gyantse and Tatung abandoned, on payment, 
rest houses and communication facilities, and conceded the 
right to China to have trade agencies in Calcutta, Kalimpong 
4 
and New Dehli on a reciprocal basis. But, China continued 
the policy aimed at, to annex Tibet. Dalai Lama fled from 
Lhasa and was granted political asylum in India. 
Chinese pressure on Nepal also increased during the 
years/the cultural revolution. King Mahendra soon found 
himself in a difficult position between two colossus. The 
1. New Developments in Friendly Relations Between China 
and Nepal, Chinese Republic's Institute of Foreign 
Affairs, Peking, 1960, p. 55 
2. Leo E, Rose, Nepal; Strategy For Survival, op. cit., 
pp. 210-213. 
3. Noor Hussain, The Security of South Asia - American and 
Asian Perspectives New Delhi, p. 36 
4. Ibid., pp.38 
i;t 
Increase in tension between India and china posed a threat 
to Nepal's neutrality and resulted into an embarrassing 
situation for the Government. 
King Mahendra expelled the representatives of the 
Dalai Latnax and discontinued arms aid to Khampa rebels on 
China's request. He forbid entiry within twenty miles of the 
Tibet border to all foreigners, including Indians, and asked 
India to withdraw its seventeen wireless operations in that 
area. He also granted China the contract to build East-West 
2 
highway through Nepal. 
Simultaneously, King Mahendra did not accede to 
several other Chinese demands. China was not given permi-
ssion to recruit Gorkha troops. It was not allowed to post 
its technicians on the Indian border, and move about feeely 
in Nepal, or circulate literature without restraint. 
4 
Thus, India's profile remained the highest in Nepal. 
This was symbolised by the prominent and enoztnous establx-
shments of the Indian Embassy, the Indian cooperation Mission, 
and the Indian Mllitazry Liaison Group in Kathmandu. However, 
India did not react against the normalisation of Sino-
Nepalese relations but unconditional Chinese economic aid 
was regarded as a political move aimed to weaning Nepal 
1. Surjeet Mansingh India after Indira N. Delhi. 
2. Ibid, p. 284 
3. See RamaXant, Nepal. China & India.Abhinav Publications 
Hew Delhi, 197«, pp,214-225 
4. See, H.M. King Mahendra, Proclarnation, Speaches And 
Messages, Department of Publicity, Ministry of infor-
mation & Broadcasting. H.M.G, Nepal, Kathmandu, 1976; 
Foreign Affairs Record, Publications Division, Ministry 
of External Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi. 
Vol.11, No.12, December 1956, pp.212-213, The Hindu. 
December 20, 1956. 
1-t 
away £con India. Dc. Rajendra Prasad, President of India* 
v i s i t e d Nepal and offered India's ass is tance to Nepal for 
her F i r s t Five Year Plan. 
Indo-Nepalese re la t ions assumed disturbing dimensions 
during 1961>62« a t the time of Sino-Indian c o n f l i c t . Thousands 
of square miles of t err i tory became openly disputed along 
the 3000 Kilometre front iers stretching from Aksai-Chin 
across«^ Uttar Pradesh* Himachal Pradesh* Punjab, NEFA and 
a l so along China's border with ^utan« sikkim including 
Nepal. I t Is s i gn i f i cant to note here that China had signed 
a border demarcation agreement with Nepal in 1960-61 as proof 
of i t s non-bell igerent securi ty p o l i c i e s with smaller south 
2 
Asian neighbours. 
Obviously* keeping in view i t s s t ra teg i c interests« 
India not only abandoned pressures against Nepal, but a l so 
3 
reconciled i t s e l f with the Nepalese regime. Nepal a l so rea-
l i s e d that i t had not merely to ensure India's s tra teg ic 
in teres t s but a l so to see t o i t s own socio-economic interests* 
4 
Which were so Irrevocably bound up with India, she* there-
fore* took a neutral stand during the sino-Indian dispute. 
Implications of Sino-fodian Conflict on India's Policy 
Towarda Nepal 
^ e sino-Indian c o n f l i c t l e f t an important legacy 
for Nepal in Indo-Nepal re la t ions . India's mil itary setback 
1. Asian Recorder, vo l . I* No. 96* October 27-Noveinber 2* 
1^5^* pp. 116^-04 
2. Noor A. Husain - India Regional Policyt Strategic 
i'\ 
forced Nepal to observe a greater degree o£ p o l i t i c a l neu-
t r a l i t y between i t s two big neighbours and to ensure^ i>arti-
cu lar ly , China's interests in Nepal more careful ly . 
"^  The Sino-Indian conf l i c t had upset the power balance 
in the region t o China's advantage, similar threat was ' 
inherent in the emergence of slno-Pa^ col lus ion against India 
during the 1965 Indo-Pak c o n f l i c t . In which Nepal once again 
maintained neutra l i ty . Obviously, Nepal's importance increased 
in India's foreign policy and the regional '^balance" became 
mofe meaningful. The Sino-Indian border dispute, in truth, 
provided an opportunity to India. Interest ingly , India 
extended extensive economic ass is tance and trade concessions 
to Nepal following the c r i s i s . Peking a lso supported the Nepal 
regime and participated more act ive ly in Nepal's economic 
development. In th i s sense . I t can be concluded that China 
has played a h i s tor i c role In Nepal's search for national 
Identity . I t has enabled Nepal to a t tract large aid from other 
sources, part icularly India. But the basic framework of Indo-
Nepalese relat ions remained uninjured. Nepal's China policy 
has, obviously, some l imi ta t ions . I t became evident in 1969-71, 
when India refused to be pressurised, and adopted a s t r i c t l y 
formal, strong and reciprocal att itude* Nepal had ult imately 
to y i e ld and sign the Trade And Transit Treaty as India desired. 
China Just could not help Nepal. I t i s being much more rea l i sed 
now that India has great stakes in Nepal and a lso the means to 
2 
achieve them. 
Mrs. Indira Gandni adopted a hard-line policy towards 
Nepal. Her pol icy , s i g n i f i c a n t l y , was based on perceptions 
1, Hindustan standard. New Delhi, May 29, 1959 
2. Surj i t M., "Search for Power* p.284 
ir, 
prevalent in the Ministry of External Affairs , that Nepal 
was economically dependent on India and therefore* i t should 
not be allowed to pers i s t in demanding spec ia l treatment from 
India without reciprocal ly respecting India's special security 
interests in the North. Mrs, Gandhi appeared to overlook the 
factor that Nepal did not l ike to be reminded of i t s economic 
dependence and could express i t s resentment in embarrasing 
ways. Ttie Mepalese regime too fa i l ed to appreciate New Delhi's 
sense of weakness with respect to China, To reca l l , due to 
Nepal's resentment, China obtained better public i ty in Nepal 
for l e s s contribution than India. Consequently* Nepal drew 
dangerously near to China rather than India in 1969 and 1976, 
In 1969-1970» the Nepalese regime appeared to be 
disagreed aoout the relevance of spec ia l relat ionship with 
India while the Indian policy-makers maintained a s imilar 
posture. Further, Nepal pressed the idea of replacing i t s 
spec ia l re lat ionship with India with equidistance between 
India and China. But, Nepal was not in favour of i t . However, 
India agreed to disband i t s Military Liaises group and 
withdrew mil i tary technicians, simultaneously* India a lso 
raised the question of closing the Indo-Nepal border and 
s t a l l e d on revising Trade and Transit Treaty due to expire 
in 1970. 
In 1971 King Mahendra signed a f i v e year Trade and 
Transit Treaty with India. India ins i s ted on retaining cxie 
2 treaty , which had dif ferent interpretat ions . During 1971-72, 
Mrs. Gandhi was very much preoccupied with the Bangladesh 
1, Rishikesh shah, Nepali P o l i t i c s t Retrospect and Prospect, 
Delhi, 1975, pp.130-32 
2 . Chapter II deals with Trade and Transit Treaties and 
interes ts in d e t a i l . 
crisis* Nepal maintained a seperateness but compactness with 
India and Bangladesh. Nepal supported the 1971 Indian reso-
lution to declare the Indian Ocean as a zone of Peace. 
In 1972« King Mahendra was succeeded by his son 
Blrendra Bikramshah. Mrs. Gandhi assured him o£ ^dia*a support 
in dealing with antlnatlonal elements. New joint projects 
were planned by both the countries to uplift Nepal's economy 
and develop some of Its inagnlfIclent water and power resources. 
However, harmony broke down temporarily in 1975 when the 
Trade and Transit Treaty came up for approval, 
P. "^^ epal's Proposal of zone of Peace 
Klriy B lrendr* , s l g n i t lean t l y , propostid in 197b t h a t 
"Nepal be dec lared a zone of peace . The proposal was formally 
mooted by King Blrendra a t h i s coronat ion recept ion in 
February 1975. He s a l d t "We need peace for our s e c u r i t y , we 
need peace for development - i t i s wi th the earnes t d e s i r e to 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e peace tha t I propose t h a t my country, Nepal 
2 be declaured as a zone of peace . 
The proposal had rece ived wide p u b l i c i t y in the 60s . 
I t was opened up by Nepal during the v i s i t of Mr, p.V. 
Narasimha Rao, Ind ia ' s Foreign Minis ter to Kathmandu a t the 
end of November 1982, pres ident san j iva Reddy a l s o v i s i t e d 
Nepal a t t h a t t ime. King Blrendra sought Ind ia ' s support for 
the peace zone proposal during t h e s e v i s i t s . The Indian p o l i c y 3 
makers assured Nepal t o study the Nepalese proposal . 
1. His Majesty King Blrendra'Speaks on Foreign P o l i c y , 
Government of Nepal, Kathmandu, 19 79 , p , f l 
2 . For the f u l l t e x t s e e Nepal News, New Delh i , August 4 , 
1978; a l s o s e e Tlie Ris ing NepaTT Kathmandu, Sept . 9 ,1973 , 
Nepal Recorder, New De lh i , December 17 , 1980; M.S* Agwanl, 
Ashwin K. Ray« S a t i s h Kximar, South Asia» s t a b i l i t y & 
Regional Cooperation, Chandigarh, 1983, pp,84-'8S, The 
Ri s ing Nepal, February 2 , 1982; Navyug, (Kathmandu), 
December 17 , 1971, 
3 . The s e e Hindustan Times,(New Delhi) 7 December, 1982. 
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The zone o£ peace proposal , bom out of the d e s i r e t o 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l i z e peace« adds a new dimension to Nepal 's 
fore ign p o l i c y . The o r i g i n of the proposa l . I t Is b e l i e v e d , 
can be traced t o a f ear -psychosIs generated by the de fea t 
of Pakistan In 1971 Indo-Pak war and t h e emergence of India 
as a prererolnent power In south A s i a . Ind ia ' s r o l e In the 
l i b e r a t i o n war of Bangladesh crea ted apprehensions among 
Nepalese r u l i n g e l i t e t h a t India had e x p e n s l o n l s t d e s i g n s . 
Ind ia ' s nuclear t e s t exp los ion on May 18 , 1974 further 
s trengthened such assumptions. The Nepal regime presumed that 
India could use I t s newly developed nuclear power to In ter fere 
2 in I t s Internal a f f a i r s . Further, the merger of Slkklm in 3 India aroused a s trong react ion In Nepal . In a d d i t i o n , the 
s o v i e t in trus ion i n t o Afghanistan in 1979 a l s o encouraged 
4 Nepalese regime t o put forward the zone of peace proposal . 
S i g n i f i c a n t l y , Nepal ' s i n i t i a t i v e in t h i s regard was 
a l s o cons idered t o be aimed a t secur ing c e r t a i n fore ign p o l i c y 
o b j e c t i v e s . F i r s t l y , i t roig^t be convenient f o r Nepal t o 
maintain balance between i t s two big neighbours - India and 
China. Secondly, i t cou ld use the proposal as a bargaining 
counter t o e x t r a c t more economic concess ions from New Delh i . 
Thirdly , i t might enable Nepal t o put up a j o i n t f ront of 
smal l powers of the reg ion i . e . Pakis tan , Bangladesh, s r l 
Lanka, Bhutan and Maldives , to p r e s s u r i s e India to make 
5 
p o l i t i c a l and economic c o n c e s s i o n s . 
1 . M.D. I^ararodasanl 'Nepals propoaal for zone of Peace* 
in south Asia - s t a b i l i t y and Regional cooperat ion . 
Chandigarh (India) pp. 83 
2 . The Matrubhuml, Kathraandu, May 2 1 , 1974 
3 . The Ris ing Nepal , September 4 , 1974» a l s o s e e The Mother-
land Kathmandu, September 6 , 1974; N.C. Menon "The Orchid 
Kingdoms External Inf luences" , Ttte Hindustan Times, 
October 15, 1974 
4 . Srlman Ranjan J o s e , "Nepal's zone of Peace Proposal -
Seven years Later ," The Ris ing Nepal, February 20 , 1982 
5. M.S. Agwanl, Ashwln K. i^ay, s a t i s h Kumar, o p . c l t . , p .89 
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I n d i a ' s i n i t i a l response to the peace zone proposal 
was s t a b l e . India d id not make any commitinent on the propo-
s a l . In Apri l 1976, Tuls i Gir i , Nepal ' s Prime Minis ter came 
t o India t o convince New Delhi In t h i s regard. He could*nt 
be s u c e s s f u l in h i s m i s s i o n . 
ttie emergence of Janata Party regime in 1977 brougnt 
no change in Ind ia ' s s tand . A.B, Vajpayee, External Affa irs 
Minis ter and Morarjl Desai , the prime Minis ter v i s i t e d Nepal 
and showed no i n t e r e s t in the peace zone proposal . Morarjl 
Desai observed t h a t s i n c e there was already a t r e a t y between 
the^two c o u n t r i e s , Nepal should not f e e l threatened by India 
In any matter . India , t h u s , cont inued i t s p o l i c y of f r i e n d -
s h i p and good ne ighbour l iness towards Nepal. 
After the f a l l of Janata regime and re-emergence of 
the congress r u l e a t New Delh i , India maintained goodwil l 
ges ture towards Nepal but made no c l e a r stand on zone of 
peace proposa l . 
The fo l lowing were b e l i e v e d t o be the main reasons for 
I n d i a ' s firm stands F i r s t , India b e l i e v e d t h a t the proposal 
ignored the b a s i c g e o - p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t i e s . Indo-Nepalese 
r e l a t i o n s could not be equated with Nepal ' s r e l a t i o n s with 
China. While I n d i a ' s s e c u r i t y Is t i e d up with Nepa l ' s , 
China's n o t . Indian presence in Nepal can not 
4 
threaten China's s e c u r i t y but the converse i s not t r u e . 
There would be s e r i o u s impl i ca t ions for India , t h e r e f o r e , 
1 . The Ris ing Nepal, November 18, 1976. 
2 . The Times of India , New De lh i , Ju ly 27, 1977 
3 . I b i d . , December 12, 1977 
4 . M.D. Dharmdasanl, Nepal ' s Proposal f o r zone of Peace in 
south Asia - S t a b i l i t y and Regional Cooperation, p.91 
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India could not accept the neutra l s t a t u s of Nepal. Second, 
the zone of peace proposal lacked genuineness . India was 
comnltted t o Nepal 's sovere ignty and i n t e g r i t y . A s t a b l e 
Nepal was in Ind ia ' s i n t e r e s t , wh i l e the proposal could 
harm Ind ia ' s s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t s in the reg ion . 
The meeting between Rajiv Gandhi, the Prime Minis ter 
and Nepal ' s King Birendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev in Belgrade 
on September 4 , 1989 was widely welcomed and the proposal of 
zone of peace was b e l i e v e d t o be on the agenda. I t was demanded 
by some Nepal i l eaders that the Nepalese proposal for the 
acceptance of the zone of peace by India must be l inked with 
the ques t ion of r e l a t i o n of democracy and freedom in Nepal . 
P.V. Narasimha Rao had already v i s i t e d Nepal on 
August 26, 1989 before the summit meeting of Belgrade Nepalese 
counter part agreed to exchange s u b s t a n t i v e i s s u e s . Nepal 
was agreeab le , no tab ly , t o the general framework of the 
agenda with the sugges t ion t h a t the d i s c u s s i o n on the working 
of the t r e a t y should inc lude i t s review and the zone of peace 
proposal should form part of d i s c u s s i o n s on s e c u r i t y percep-
2 t i o n s . 
Prime Minis ter of Nepal, K.P« Bhattaral v i s i t e d India 
from 8->l0 June 1990 a t the i n v i t a t i o n of prime Minister of 
India V.P. Singh. The two leaders r e i t e r a t e d t h e i r Government's 
adherence t o and r e s p e c t for the p r i n c i p l e s of sovere ign 
equal i ty« t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y , n a t i o n a l Independence, non-
use of force and non Inter ference in each o t h e r ' s Internal 
3 
a f f a i r s , s i g n i f i c a n t l y , the t e x t of Indo-Nepal J o i n t 
1 . The Indian Express, New Delhi August 28, 1989 
2 . The Hindustan Times, New Delh i , August 27, 1989. 
3 . See the t e s t of Indo-Nepal J o i n t Communique. 
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Conimunique remained s i l e n t on the proposal of zone of peace. 
However^ Mr. Bhattarai , addressing a j o i n t press conference 
wi th V.P, Singh, a l l a y e d Indian "suscept ibi l i ty** on the 
1 
proposal tha t Nepal be declared a zone of peace . 
In fact* Mew Delhi should say s e r i o u s a t t e n t i o n to 
the zcxie of peace proposal because some of the guarantors 
of t h i s proposals were countr ies l i k e the U.S .A. , China, 
2 U.K., and Pakistan who perhaps were envious of India ' s 
f a s t development in d i f f e r e n t f i e l d s . They would not l i k e 
India to emerge as a s trong force in the developing world. 
In sum, the eroergene of democratic process in Ne^al 
i s a r e a l i t y today• I t cannot be ignored by India . The 
democratic change in Nepal presents the Indian government 
wi th a new s e t of o p p o r t u n i t i e s . Democratic Nepal f e e l s 
c l o s e r t o India than any other neighbour including China. 
1 , Ttie Hindustan Tiroes,New Delh i , June 1 1 , 1990 
2 . See New China News Agency Peking, May 26, 1976 and 
June 3 , 1976; South Asian Reporter, v o l . l . No. 7 , 
February 15, 1978; The Ris ing Nepal, November 18, 
1976; Nepal News, November 10 , 197 8 and January 19, 
1982, 
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INIX) NEPAL ECONOMIC T I E S 
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INDO-NEPAL ECONOMIC TIES 
A, Ind ia ' s P o l i c y Towards Agreements 
India and Nepal concluded a " s t a n d s t i l l agreement" in 
1947 under which I n d i a ' s s t a t u s as the succes sor power to 
the B r i t i s h was recognised and the terms o£ r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between India and Nepal as they e x i s t e d p r i o r t o independence 
were r e t a i n e d . Thus, India accepted the 192 3 t r e a t y In which 
Nepal ' s in t erna l and ex terna l s o v e r e i g n t y had been recognised , 
consequent ly , the Nepal regime adopted the p o l i c y of accomo-
dat ion wi th India a f t e r independence. 
The 1947 s t a n d s t i l l agreement between India and Nepal 
had been temporari ly pla^ined. A new t r e a t y for the cont inuat ion 
of Gorkha Recruitment was s igned in Nov 1947. The d i s c u s s i o n s 
on the treaty s tarted s incerely only after C.P.N. Singh became 
ambassoder of India to Nepal. During the negot iat ions , India 
emphasised l ibera l i sa t ion of Nepal administration in return 
to the formal recognition of the Rana regime. The King was 
not disposed to make concessions. Bat, India continued to 
i n s i s t on p o l i t i c a l reforms in Nepal. 
There were two factors which influenced the negotiation 
diplomacy of treaty of trade between India and Nepal. Firstly^ 
many leaders of the opposition in Nepal questioned the l e g i -
timacy of the Rana regime. They characterized Nepal's policy 
to gain U.N. membership as anti-Indian in motivation Rumours 
about the Kings * a l leged intention to "lease" eastexm Nepal 
to the United s ta tes and to conclude a "secret" treaty with 
Pakistan were a l so c irculated widely by the Nepali diss idents .^ 
1. Arorit Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, December 29, 1949 
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Secondly, Nepal careful ly and successful ly attempted 
to enrage India's growing concern over China's expansionist 
intent ions . The Chinese convnunist regime had threatened to 
l iberate Tibet in November 1949, The Nepali opposition leaders 
cautioned India that i£ the Government of India adopted a 
pol icy o£ helpful cooperation with the Ranas on the plea of 
counteracting communist i n f i l t r a t i o n from the North, people 
of Nepal would be compelled In frustration to seek support 
from the Northern neighbour in the freedom struggle against 
the Ranas. 
The Government of India obviously adopted the middle 
way pol icy . In a foreign pol icy statement to the Parliament 
on March 17« 1950« Nehra la id down the basic principle of 
India's foreign pol icy % 
"We have advised in earnestness the Government of 
Nepal, to the extent a fr iendly power can advise an indepen-
dent nation, that in the inner context of Nepal, i t i s des i -
rable to pay attention to the forces which are moving in the 
world, the democratic forces and forces of freedom, and put 
2 themselves in l i n e with them. Regarding the suggestion 
proposed by B.P. Koirala of a mil i tary a l l iance between India 
and i^epal Nehru saids "The fact remains that we can not t o l e -
rat:e any foreign invasion from any foreign country in any 
part of the Indian subcontinent. Any possible invasion of 
Nepal would inevitably involve, the safety of India." 
This statement became a consistent theme in India's 
defence and foreign pol icy by the successive government at 
New Delhi. 
1. Ib id . , November 16, 1949| a l so see The Statesman 
Calcutta, February 21, 1950. 
2. -Parliamentary Debates, Part I I , March 17, 1950, c o l , 
1697-1698 
3. Ib id . , c o l . 1698 
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New Delhi. 
The situation ou the northern border was becoming 
increasingly threatening. India apparently decided to reach 
on agreement with the Ranas before the Chinese had established 
themselves in Tibet. The treaties of "Peace and Friendship" 
and of "Trade and Commerce" were signed by the representatives 
of Nepal and India in Kathmandu on July 31, 1950 and were 
subsequently ratified by both governments. 
The treaty of peace and friendship provided both govern-
ments" to inform each other of any serious friction or mis-
understanding with any neighbourdLng state likely to cause 
any danger in the friendly relations subsisting between the 
two governments. The "letter of exchange" that accompanied 
the treaty promised that neither Government shall tolerate 
any threat to the security of the other by a foreign aggressor. 
To deal with any such threat the two Governments shall consult 
2 
with each other and devise effective counter measures. Article 
5 of the treaty of peace and friendship granted ^epal the 
right to import arms« amnunltion or warlike materials and 
equipment necessary for the security of Nepal« through India. 
Such deals were to be chalked out through Joint consultations. 
The treaty did not impose any formal or procedural restric-
tions on Nepal*8 right to obtain arms but there was believed 
to be silent agreement on the sources from which arms would 
be obtained. 
The treaty imposed obligations on both the nations 
to extend reciprocal rights to citizens of the other with 
1 . See S.D. Muni, op . c i t . 
2. Jawahar Lai Nehru, I n d i a ' s Foreign Policy» Selected 
Speeches, September 1946 to Apri l 1961, New Delhi , Minis try 
of Information and Broadcasting, 1961, p.374 
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respect to participation in industrial and ec^womic develop-
ment* trade and comnerce* residence and ownership of property 
in each other's terr i tory . Although th is obligation has been 
f u l l y applied to Nepalese resident in India who enjoy 
v ir tua l ly equal c i t i zenship r ights with Indians in these 
respects* the reverse has not been the case for Indians 
resident in Nepal.^ Traditional re s t r i c t ions on the right 
of Indians and other foreigners to engage in conmerce* pur-, 
chase of land, res ide in certain areas and o%m Industrial 
establishments have by no means been eliminated, presumably 
2 
with the t a c i t consent of the Indian Government, But* the 
lack of c l a r i t y in th i s regard has been a source of mis-
underatanding and d i s trus t between India and Nepal as was 
evident after the expiry of the Treaty of Trade and Transit 
In 1960. 
In fact* the treaty secured "national treatment** for 
the c i t i zens of one country residing in the terr i tory of the 
other, in matters of residence* property* profession* movement 
e t c . I t provided that the Indian Government and people w i l l 
be treated equally with the Nepalese c i t izens* and in addl-
tl(»a* preferent ia l ly against foreigners In the f i e l d of 
economic and industrial sphere in Nepal. Thus* Nepal fu l ly 
accocQodated Indian security and commercial Interests under 
these two t r e a t e s . 
1 . Leo E. Rose* Nepali strategy For survival , op, c l t . 
P.186 
2. Ibid. 
3. See B.P. Shrestha* An Introduction to the Nepal Economy, 
Kathraandu* 1962, pp.140-141; G^D* Pathak, 'Nepal's Trade 
with Her Neighbour - The Trade Pact of 1950*, Nepal 
Review, September 30, 1963, pp.6-7 
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B. Trade Treaty of 1960 
A new trade t r e a t y between India and I^ e^pal was s igned 
on September 11# I960 . Approximately a l l of the major Nepal i 
coroplainta a g a i n s t the e x i s t i n g trade system were s a t i s f i e d 
in the new agreement ( 
1 . Nepal was no longer o b l i g a t e d t o '*clear" the terms 
of trade r e l a t i o n s with t h i r d countr ies wi th the Indian 
Government; 
2 . The J o i n t exchange accovint for fore ign currency 
administered by India was terminated and Nepal was 
granted a separate exchange account; 
3 . Trans i t f a c i l i t i e s wi th in India for Nepal i imports 
and exports were to be implemented in confoxrmlty with 
the usua l i n t e r n a t i o n a l convent ions ; 
4 . N«pall trade t r a f f i c in t r a n s i t through India was 
exempted from Indian customs or t r a n s i t d u t i e s ; and 
5 . Trade between India and Nepal was exempted from customs 
dut ies and quotas except as s p e c i f i e d by the two 
governments. 
In addition;,Nepal agreed t h a t goods imported by her 
from t h i r d countr i e s would no t be reexported t o Ind ia . India 
a l lowed the Nepal Government t o cont inue t o Impose dut i e s 
on goods imported from or exported t o India a t i t s own 
d i s c r e t i o n . Obviously , the trading community In Nepal w e l -
comed the new agreement. 
The formulation and implementation of the Treaty of 
1960 l e d to some problons . Nepal and Pakistan s i g n e d a Trade 
Agreement in which Pakistan had assured Nepal about the oprt. 
through TPaklsta 
and t r a n s i t f a c i l i t i e s for i t s trade wi th the overseas nat ions / 2 
t e r r i t o r y . The d i f f i c u l t i e s came t o the f ront when Nepal 
1 . Leo E.Rose, Nepals s t r a t e g y for surv iva l p p . C i t , p . 2 3 0 - 2 3 l 
2 . Or ig ina l Text of the Nepal-Pakistan Trade Agreement 
and i t s P r o t o c o l , Minis try of External A f f a i r s . Archives , 
HMG Nepal, Kathmandu# Documents No.42 
;^ s 
o f f i c i a l l y demanded in Ju ly 1963« for t r a n s i t f a c i l i t i e s 
a t Radhikapur and Wagha on I n d i a ' s borders with East and 
West Pakistan r e s p e c t i v e l y . However^ India agreed to t h i s 
demand* provided i f Nepal Mas ready t o bear the c o s t of such 
2 f a c i l i t i e s . But« the c o s t of f a c i l i t i e s es t imated by India 3 d id not s a t i s f y Nepal . rOcxe matter became so compricated 4 
t h a t i t came t o a complete s t a n d s t i l l . Ih response« Dr. 
T u l s i ^ ir i« Nepal ' s chairman of the counc i l of Min i s ters 
acc\jised India s t a t i n g s 'Ve want to e x e r c i s e the freedom of 
trade wi th other countr ies but o b s t a c l e s are put in our way. 5 We are not being al lowed to trade f r e e l y with Pakis tan ." 
U l t i m a t e l y India agreed in January 1965 t o provide the des i red 
f a c i l i t i e s to Nepal a t Radhikapur f o r nominal r a i l s e r v i c e 
s 
charges . But in the meantime the Indo-Pal: c o n f l i c t in Sept -
ember 1965 broke out which d i srupted the t r a n s i t p o i n t s . After 
the war, India t o l d Nepal to rega in the t r a n s i t f a c i l i t i e s 
a t Radhikapur a f t e r the repa ir of the rai lway track provided 
the Nepal i traders could make t h e i r own arrangements for 
the movement of goods from Radhikapur towards the Pakistan 
border. 
In a d d i t i o n of t h e s e o b j e c t i o n s * Nepal a l s o h i g h l i g h t e d 
the a t t i t u d e of the Indian customs a u t h o r i t i e s a t Calcutta 
por t and on the Indo-Nepal border which of ten r e s u l t e d in 
1 . Minutes of the meeting between Indian and the Nepalese 
Delegat ions t o d i scuss Trade Matters» 27 t o 31 Ju ly , 
1963, Ministry of External A f f a i r s Archives , HMG, Nepal 
Kathmandu, Document No.5 , para 1 0 . 
2 . , I b i d , para 1 1 , The Statesmen, October 24 , 1963 
3 . Motherland, January 6 , 1964 
4 . The Hindustan Times, Novenober 28 and 30, 1964 
5 . Naya Samaj, December 4 , 1969 
6 . The Hindus tan Tiroes, January 8, 1965; s e e sriraan Narayan, 
India and ISepalt An EKercise in Open Diplomacy, Bombay, 
1970. 
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delay in movement of the Nepali goods through the Indian 
territory, Nepal also complained about discriminatory excise 
on the Nepali products in India* inadequate number of railway 
wagons made available to the Nepali traders, difficulties 
in road trans^ jort and irregular and inadequate supplies 
of imported goods* 
But, from the ^dian point of view the most serious 
problem remaining in trade relations between the two coun-
tries concerns the extensive smuggling accross the long, 
2 
open Indo-Nepal border . It traditionally involved the 
unregulated and uncontrolled transport and sale of surplus 
agricultural products from the Nepali Tarai to the chroni-
cally deficit areas of northern India. Neither government 
was particularly disturbed by this illegal trade, as it 
held advantages for both sides, India obtained ready access 
to badly needed food grains and Kathmandu gained huge 
quantities of Indian Ibupees, part of which could then be 
used to purphase foodgrains at Indian markets more conven-
ient to the lines of communication into the deficit food 
areas in the hill areas of Nepal, including Kathmandu 
3 
valley. 
In this process smuggling involved the goods imported 
from third countries i.e., China, Korea, u,S.S,R. and were 
exempted from the usual customs duties by Nepal. It provided 
these goods a considerable a'dvantage over similar Indian 
products. It obviously compelled India to raise objections 
on pre\«iiling smuggling on the border. Thus, India on its 
1, S.D. Muni o p . c i t ; pp.206-207 
2 , The Hindustan Times, December 30, 1968 
3 , Leo E.Rose, Nepal s t r a t e g y for Survival op . c i t . , 
pp. 254-255 
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part was not happy with the leakage and snuggl ing of goods 
in t r a n s i t , India was a l s o annoyed about the d ivers ion and 
d e f l e c t i o n of t r a d e , the r e - e x p o r t of petroleum and p e t r o -
leum products t o T ibe t . India o f ten j u s t i f i e d the d e t a i l e d 
procedural f o r m a l i t i e s and customs s e c u r i t y regarding the 
Nepal i goods in t r a n s i t through India, as p r o t e c t i v e 
measures a g a i n s t smuggling, leakage and d e f l e c t i o n of 
2 goods. Anyway, these d i f ferenceswere d i scussed and s e t t l e d 
thjgough mutual n e g o t i a t i o n s between India and Nepal t h a t 
took p lace under the prov i s ions of the Trade Treaty of 
1960. 
India had offered many concessions in order to 
appease the government of Nepal. Nepal, for instance, has 
attempted to export to India only about 40 percent of the 
stainless steel it had imported from Japan. The balance was 
substantial in comparison with Nepal's domestic requirements, 
New Delhi believed that a considerable quantity of the 
stainless steel would be smuggled into India, similar was 
the case with fibres and allied products. But, India did 
not ban the import of stainless steel products and synthe«-
tic fibres. The media in India felt that it would have been 
more dignified to seek dealings equitable to both parties 
and to offer facilities as special concession pressure. 
But, India adopted liberal attitude, believed to be, to 
4 
solve problems. 
The question of revision of the 1960 Trade Treaty, 
due in October 1970, brought sc^e conflicting ideas between 
1. The Statesman, November 20, 1968 
2 . Understanding on the Nepalese Trans i t T r a f f i c Through 
"Indian T e r r i t o r i e s in Continuation of ftemorandum o f ~ 
"the Treaty of Trade and Trans i t of September 11, 1960 
Between India and Nepal, Dept. of P u b l i c i t y and Bro-
adcas t ing , Minis try of Nat ional Guidance, H.rt.G., 
Nepal, Kathmandu s igned on May 19# 1961 a t New D e l h i . 
3 . The Tribune, Ambala, December 13 , 1968 
4., M.S. Dabke "Economic Ties Between India and Nepal". 
Free Press Journal , July 8, 1969 
India and Nepal. Nepal based its case for the two treaties^ 
each dealing separately with the matters related to trade 
2 
and transit. It was argued that such an arrangement would 
be able to avoid in the other area. Nepal also demanded 
adequate facilities in India, particularly at Radhikapur, 
for its trade with and through Pakistan as a matter of 
right. 
Nepal demanded for u n f e t t e r e d t r a n s i t f a c i l i t i e s . 
At the Rashtriya Panchayat debate , one member caut ioned the 
House to think of Nepal ' s d i g n i t y and i n t e r e s t s whi l e e n t e r -
ing in to a trade and t r a n s i t t r e a t y wi th India . Such a 
tready should not be concluded under p o l i t i c a l pressure or 
thi^eat. The members demanded an e a r l y f i n a l i s a t i o n of trade 3 
and t r a n s i t agreements with India . The demand for trade and 
t r a n s i t f a c i l i t i e s for Nepal under the 1965 Geneva conven-
t i o n was a l s o r a i s e d in the Rashtriya Panchayat. some members 
po inted out t h a t landlocked countr i e s l i k e Switzer land, 
Aus tr ia , Laos and Afghanistan were enjoying u n r e s t r i c t e d 
t r a n s i t f a c i l i t i e s , there fore , Nepal ' s genuine r i g h t s should 
be granted. 
Nepal adopted a tough a t t i t u d e during the negot ia t ions . 
NavraJ Subedi, Nepal ' s Minis ter of Industr ies and Commerce, 
a s s e t t e d t h a t Nepal was firm to secure adequate t r a n s i t 
f a c i l i t y and ensure the entry of Nepal i goods in Indian 
markets in t r e a t i e s wi th India to be s igned in f u t u r e . 
King Mahendra made a s tatement and declared that 
1 . The P a t r i o t , November 20, 1968 
2 . The Tiroes of India , June 18, 1970; The Hindu, November 
27 . 1970 
3 . The Times of India , Ju ly 6, 1970 
4 . The P a t r i o t , August 1, 1970 
5 . Ib id . 
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seeks nothing more thdn usual Trade and transit facilities 
In accordance with the customary international practices 
in a spirit of good neighbourliness. He further added that 
his country wanted to reduce her dependence on the tradi-
tional Indian markets and to develop trading overseas and 
did not like maintaining "special relationship" with 
India. Nepal also rejected India's proposal of further exa-
mination of the provisions of the treaty. 
Besides, Nepal wanted storage facilities at Calcutta 
Port. India and Nepal had divergent views on the matter. 
Indian policy sought a definite guarantee and necessary 
measures that deflection would stop which had costed India 
a considerable loss in foreign exchange in the past. In 
response. Nepal significantly dropped the demand for a route 
2 
through Radhikapur to Pakistan. 
India's policy was not reactionary. It consistently 
insisted that a composite treaty on the I960 pattern would 
meet the requirements of the situation bringing in external 
political considerations into the picture. Notably, the 
1960 treaty provided for free and unrestricted flow of Nepali 
goods into India without any duty. Nepali officials believed 
that this flow of Nepali goods had been seriously abused by 
both Indian and Nepalese traders. Nepal showed her readiness 
to cooperate with India in tightening up the free entry 
provisions in the revised Treaty to prevent the re-export 
of goods from third countries but on 
the condition if in turn provide under scope of the transit 
1, The Times of India, October 24, 1970 
2. The Indian Express, October 26, 1970 
o3 
arrangements to assist Nepal In event of foreign trade. 
Nepal insisted on transit facilities to Pakistan -
through RadhiXapur as a matter of right and asked for unres-
tricted access for private trade in India which involved vital 
Indian interests. Indian policy-makers were cautious to the 
fact that Nepal trade with India and the transit through 
India of Nepalese exports to and imfx^ rts from, third count-
ries were inextricably intermixed. They, therefore, favoured 
a consolidated treaty covering both transit and trade faci-
lities. In fact, the provisions of the I960 treaty had helped 
Kathmandu in increasing its exports • to third countries ten 
2 tin^s. 
India, following a "good neighbour" policy, did not 
pressurise Nepal to surrender the facilities after the expiry 
of the 1960 Trade Treaty. India was hopeful for a mutual 
agreement. The failure of a quick revision of the 1960 
treaty adversely affected Nepal's economic relations with 
4 
the rest of the world. But, India announced that the tradi-
tional trade between India and Nepal would continue as usual. 
Indian policy-makers also made it clear that India would 
attempt to find a mutually acceptable and beneficial arrange-
5 
ment for trade and transit. 
1. The Hindustan Times, November 2, 1970; also see "Oie Times 
of India, November 2, 1970; Amrit Bazar Patrika, November 2, 
1970; The Hindustan Times "Indo-Nepal Trade", Editorial, 
November 3, 1970 
2. EKR. Goplnath, 'Untenable Nepal Demands Tie up Trade Talks', 
The Patriot, November 2, l.:)70; also see The Times of India 
editorial India and Nepal; November 3, 1970 
3. The Times of India, November 3, 1970 
4. Rana, Pashupati, S.J.B., India and Nepal: "Die Political 
Economy of a Relationship. Asian Survey, Vol. XI, No.7 
July 1971 
5. Deokrishna Vyas, 'India-Nepal Trade Relations', Free 
Press Journal, November 12, 1970. Alsi see I..ok Sabna 
debates. Vol.XXXXV. No.4, November 12, 1970, Cols. 199-211 
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The Indo-J^ epal trade relations were to receive a 
severe setback if the Government of India did not extend 
the inter trade and transit arrangement with Nepal beyond 
November 30, 1979. India argued that since Pakistan was not 
allowing India's export«import trade across the land route 
to Afghanistan« another landlocked nation, it would not be 
practical for India to continue transit tacilities to Nepal 
for sending goods to Pakistan, India pointed out that though 
there was no provisin in the i960 treaty regarding the 
permission of transit facilities to Nepal across Radhlkapur, it 
would be prepared to grant such facilities when the Trans-
Asian highway project from Istambul to Kathmandu was completed* 
This extended their interim arrangement upto the end of 
December 1970* It gave sufficient time to Nepalese decision-
2 
makers to think on the concerned matters. 
However, during this period the talks between the 
3 two could not produce the desired results. India unilaterally 
announced that Nepal would continue to receive basic facili-
ties from January 1, 1971 onwards. Interestingly, Nepal did 
not ask for the extension of 'the treaty. Further, India uni-
laterally offered basic trade and transit facilities to Nepal 
and assured impirovement in it in a new treaty. The Government 
of India declared that it would permit from January 1, 1971 
the export of essential goods like milk, salt, medicines, 
cloth and kerosene from India to Nepal so that the prices in 
Nepal could remain stable. India would continue to permit the 
import of primary products like timber, free of customs duty 
1. Vijay Bhatt, "Why talks with Nepal broke down". Free 
Press Journal, December 4, 1979 
2. The Indian Express, Ugvember 28, 1979 
3. National Herald, December 27, 1970 
1 
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or q u a n t i t a t i v e r e s t r i c t i o n s and would a l so cont inue to give 
NepSl access to the sea , both for the export and imports 
from the t h i r d c o u n t r i e s . India showed her d e s i r e to o f fe r 
Nepal a d d i t i o n a l t r a n s i t f a c i l i t i e s in a new t r e a t y , India 
was a lso desirous to e s t a b l i s h 175,000 square f e e t of covered 
area a t Calcut ta Por t for Nepal 's exclus ive u s e , Ind ia a lso 
offered po r t f a c i l i t i e s a t Haldia . Thus, I n d i a ' s ges ture 
was c e r t a i n l y co rd ia l but^could not make much headway. 
The Impact of Regional P o l i t i c a l Evnironment 
The developments in the Indian subcont inent in t h e 
ea r ly 70s a l so had an e f f e c t on t he economic r e l a t i o n s between 
India and Nepal, with the beginning of the c i v i l war in 
East Pakistan, Nepal ' s i n s i s t e n c e on the passage through 
2 Radhikapur appeared to have l o s t i t s re levance . The changed 
p o l i t i c a l environment in t h e con t inen t , i t was bel ieved, would 
br ing the two na t ions c l o s e r on the p reva i l i ng n e g o t i a t i o n s . 
Nepal ' s a t t i t u d e too became sof tened. King Mahendra, 
addressing the 18th sess ion of the Rashtriya Panchayat on 
29 June , 1971, urged t h a t ^^ e^ w i l l endeavour to conclude t rade 
4 
and t r a n s i t t r a t i e a w i t h _ our f r i end ly neighbour I n d i a . 
Ind ia and Nepal s igned a new f ive year Trade and 
Trans i t Treaty on August 13, 1971 a t Kathmandu, The t r e a t y 
1, The Times of India^ December 29, 1970 
2, The Indian Express, Apri l 5 , 1971 
3 , "Running Road in Granter ,* E d i t o r i a l , The s tatesman, 'Dec 30, 
1978; "Trade With N e p a l " , E d i t o r i a l , The Hindustan Tiroes, 
Jan 5, 1970; R.L, Handa,"InAa-Nepalese Trade", The Indian 
Express, January 9, 1971; Vijay Bhatt , "Nepal Spoils Trade 
Ties With Ind i a , "Free Press J o u r n a l , March 23, 1971, 
4, The P a t r i o t , June 30, 1971 
5, For the t e x t of the Treaty see F o r e i ^ Affairs Record, 
vo l , XVII, No, VII I , August 1971, pp . 149-52 
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contained provisions on Trade as well as transit. The idea 
of a common market between the two countries stipulated in 
the Treaty of 1960 was replaced by the principle of "^ost 
favoured nations treatment** on reciprocal basis* A Joint 
communique signed by the two nations declared that primary 
products of Hepal would have unrestricted entry into the 
Indian market, facilities and preferential tariff to such 
^epalese industrial products that contained not less than 90 
percent of Nepalese or Indian materials. These materials 
would be exempted from custom duty. Detailed procedures were 
laid down to check deflection and illegal conduct of trade. 
Provision for satisfactory port and transit facilities in 
India for Nepal's overseas trade were also laid down in 
detail in the Treaty. The Treaty provided that Nepal would be 
able to impose dLmport duties on Indian products on the roost 
favoured nation basis and such duties would be refunded 
directly to the Government of Nepal to the extent of the im-
port duty chargeable to Nepal. The excise and other duties 
would be collected by the Government of India. 
India and Nepal agreed to cooperate sincerely to 
prevent infringement and circumvention of foreign exchange 
and foreign trade laws and regulations. Provisions had been 
made in the treaty for mutually acceptable overland routes 
to be used by India and Nepal. 
Significantly* the treaty stipulated that hbthihg 
in the treaty would prevent India or Nepal from taking any 
measures which must be necessary for the essential security 
interests or in pursuance of general international conven-
tions. 
1. Ibid. 
Thus« the provis ion of the new t r e a t y showed t h a t 
Nepal had compromised on I t s I n i t i a l s t and . India remained 
firm regarding the mat te rs v i t a l to i t s i n t e r e s t s . The 
gradual but d e f i n i t e improvement in domestic and p o l i t i c a l 
s i t u a t i o n and the consequent r e s t o r a t i o n of se l f confidence 
in India« u l t ima te ly led Nepal to read jus t i t s pos ture with 
I n d i a ' s r e a l i s t i c f i rmness . 
The f i r s t half of 70s brought d r a s t i c changes in the 
t rade r e l a t i o n s between India and Nepal, some of the Nepalese 
economists bel ieved t h a t the agreements between India and 2 Nepal were unequal and provided more benef i t s to I n d i a . In 
r e a c t i o n , Nepal r e s t r a i n e d Indian firms from the expor t -3 import bus iness . Ind ia a l so decided to ask Nepal to pay for 
her import of petroleum products out of her foreign exchange 4 
resources from January 1975« which was not . l iked by Nepal. 
Notably, Nepal was coming c lose r to China. Nepal and China 
concluded an agreement on May 31# 1974« on t rade and Remittance 
designed to boost the volume of t r ade between the twp 
c o u n t r i e s . Tiie agreftnent has envisaged the t r ade betweoi 
thQ» two coun t r i es through land and sea r o u t e s . I t was assumed 
1. Muni« op . c i t . p . 2 4 9 . The emergence of Bangladesh movement 
which had gained considerable momentum by June-July 1971 
was of p a r t i c u l a r relevance to t r ade r e l a t i o n s between 
India and Nepal. I f ^ i t i a l l y , Nepal had termed the movement 
as an " in t e rna l promptly recognised Bangladesh in January 
1972,see, Urmila Phadnis and S.D.Muni, "Emergence of 
Bangladesh) Responses of Ceylon and Nepal", in s . P . Verma, 
Virendra Narain (ed.) Pakistan} P o l i t i c a l System in C r i s i s , 
south Asia Studies Centre, J a i p u r , 1972, pp.173-192 
2. Yogendra vyas, "India-Nepal Treatyj J o i n t Review to Begin," 
"National Herald, December 23, 1973 
3 . The Hindustan Times, December 28, 1973 
4. Jprem Shankar Jha , "India-Nepali Economic Tiess Ambiva-
lence in Kathmandu," The Times of Ind i a , December 20,1974, 
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In Nepal t h a t the expansion and d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n of trade 
was every b i t as v i t a l to the development prospects of a 
country l i k e Nepal as I t was to the continued prosper i ty 
of a developed country. 
China and Nepal s igned another agre&nent on February 
2, 1975, a t Kathmandu regarding bu i ld ing of 407 Km, long 
Pokhara->Surkhat road In between Nepal and China. In 1975 
China was the main importer of j u t e from Nepal. The volume 
of export and Import trade between Nepal and China In 197 3-
2 74 amounted to Rs. 30 m i l l i o n . 
India cont inued. In response , goodwil l p o l i c y 
towards Nepal . India was helping a l l the way In Nepal ' s 
economic development I . e . Kosl and Gandak p r o j e c t which had 
3 
extremely bene f i t ed Nepal , I n d i a ' s concern f o r the develop-
ment of Nepal was acknowledged by Dr. Tuls l G i r l , the 
Prime Min i s t er of Nepal during h i s v i s i t to New Delhi in 
Apri l 1976. He apprec iated I n d i a ' s cooperation and s a i d : 
'*We apprec ia te t h i s not as a ges ture of f r i endsh ip but a l s o 
as I n d i a ' s genuine understanding of a neighbour's need f o r 4 
peace and development? He made i t c l e a r during h i s v i s i t 
t h a t Nepal was e q u i d i s t a n t from China and India in terms 
of s t a t e l e v e l r e l a t i o n s , aut , there were misunderstandings 
and f e a r s on both s i d e s . 
The Janata ^arty government in India al lowed to 
cont inue Indo-Nepal Trade agreements a f t e r 1976 u n t i l new 
1 . Asian Recorder, vol XX, No.32 , August 6 -12 , 1974, 
pp.12139-40 
2 . I b i d , v o l . X X I , No.13 , March 26-April 1 1 , 1975,p.12508 
3 . The Hindustan Times, Apri l 5 , 1976 
4 . Nat ional Herald, Apri l 8, 1976 
d\^ 
agreements were s e t t l e d . The Indo-b^epal Treaty of Trade and 
Transit was to be replaced af ter 1976. The Janata regime 
agreed that separate t rea t i e s to cover trade and trans i t 
2 
should be concluded expedit iously . I t had also agreed to 
enlarge the scope of preferences for Nepalese manufactured 
products in the Indian market In order to boost Indus-* 
t r l a l l s a t l o n process In Nepal. The new f a c i l i t i e s la id down 
the procedures to be followed for Nepal's t ra f f i c in trans i t 
through India. I t also f a c i l i t a t e d t r a f f i c in trans i t for 
Nepal's cargo. 
Notably* Nepal and Bangladesh had entered into ~a 
Treaty of Transit In 1976 which provided the use of Bangla-
desh ports to f a c i l i t a t e Nepal's overseas trade. The govern-
ment of India also agreed to provide Nepal overland routes 
for her trade with Bangladesh or with third countries through 4 Bangladesh. 
India and Nepal agreed that in order to f a c i l i t a t e 
e f f ec t ive and cordial implementation of the Treaties and 
Agreements« separate o f f i c i a l s groups would meet regularly. 
I t was believed that th i s new gesture of good-will would 
open a new chapter In the economic re lat ions between the 
two countries . India and Nepal further signed a Memorandum 
of Understanding on July 30* 1978 on the scope of Jo int 
1 . "India-Nepal Ties ,* Editorial , The Patriot , April 8, 
1976/ The Times of India, April 9, 1976 
2. Foreign Affairs Record, vol.xxiV, No. 3, March 3, 1978, 
p.146. 
3 . Ibid . 
4 . Ibid . 
5. "indo-Nepalese Ventures,Edotorial. The Hindu, August 3, 
1978 
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Industrial ventures In Nepal. The Joint press release on 
th i s occasion said that the understanding was aimed to 
es tab l i sh j o i n t projects covering large« medium* small scale 
cottage and agro-industrial sec tors . 
India*s pol icy was s tated to be aimed at as s i s t ing 
Nepal to reduce her trade d e f i c i t s with India, i t was 
oriented towards the development of human and material 
resources of the region for the welfare of new development 
strategy and was also suitable to the concept of economic 
independence that was necessary for the overal l development 
2 of the Third World countries . 
The Janata regime at New Delhi signed a Memorandum 
of Understanding with Nepal to launch four or f ive major 
Industt ies involving a to ta l investment of Rs. 180 crores. 
The Jo int Press release said that Rs. 80 crore cement and 
cl inker plant at Udaipur in* Eastern Nepal, a Rs. 80 crore 
composite paper and pulp factory in western Nepal« Rs.20 
crore for magnesite# zinc and lead units# and another 
R8» 20 crore for a railway l ine to f a c i l i t a b l e international 
trade would be included in t h i s understanding.^ India and 
Nepal a lso act ive ly cooperated in the development of water 
resources. India had committed to a long-term purchase of 
t^e whole or part ia l of the power generated from the 
Kamauli Hydro-electric project . This mul t i -b i l l ion dol lar 
project was establ ished on the Kamauli r iver to supply 4 
e l e c t r i c i t y to energy-starved areas of U.P. 
1 . Foreign Affairs Record, v o l . x v i l / No. VIII, July,1978 
2. "Joint Ventures with Nepal",Editorial, The Tribune, August 
5, 1978; also see The Tribune, September 28, 1978 
3 . '•A New Dimention", Amrit Bazar Patrika, October 3, 1978; 
a lso see , P.S. Ramu,"Indo-Nepal Economic cooperation," 
The Hindustan Times, December 20, 1981. 
4. Asian Recorder, March 12-16, 1985, p.18219 
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Thus* India and ^epal resolved the ir eoonomic 
differences in 197 8. Nepal received favourable resul ts 
on separate trade and trans i t t r e a t i e s . India obtained 
promises of cooperation on the Devighat and Kamauli river 
schemes. 
•/ 
D. India's Policy in the Eightees 
King Birendra v i s i t e d India in March 1980 af ter the 
f a l l of Janata regime and the reemergence of Mrs. Indira 
Gandhi as Prime Minister of India, President Neelam Sanjeeva 
Reddy also v i s i t e d Nepal and assured that India had no 
intention of interfering in Nepal's internal a f f a i r s . But 
Nepal had lodged a strong protest on September 15, 1983 
against the al leged entry of Indian armed pol ice personnel 
into Nepalese terr i tory at Susta, k i l l i n g of people and 
loot ing of property. 
The Indian President Mr. Zail Singh paid a v i s i t to 
Nepal on July 21« 1986. On July 22, speaking at a c i v i c 
reception hosted by Kathmandu Nagar Panchayat, he saidt 
'*We have binding relgious and cultural l inks and there i s 
an abundant fee l ing of goodwill and friendship between the 
two countries ." India's pol icy towajpds Nepal from 1984 to 
1986 remained ambivalent. 
Indo-Nepal re lat ions touched a low ebb when Nepal 
opted for Chinese ant ia ircraf t guns and other weapons in 
1988- The relat ions suffered a further setback in 1989 
when trade and trans i t t rea t i e s expired on the question 
whether there should be one treaty as put forward by India 
or separate treat ies* as demanded by Nepal* Nepal desired 
1. Asian Recorder» November 20 - December 2, 1983 
4.? 
to have the roost favoured nat ion treatment under which the 
t r a n s i t p o i n t s were reduced from 17 to two. In short open 
migration« work permit and trade and t r a n s i t problems had 
c o n s t i t u t e d the major po in t s of the Indo-Nepalese agenda for 
d i s c u s s i o n . 
In such a s i t u a t i o n , a meeting of the Nepal-India 
J o i n t oommlsslon, scheduled to begun on January 11,, 1938, 
was postponed on I n d i a ' s reques t . 
The J o i n t Oommlssion did hold t a l k s a t Kathmandu 
on August 13 , 1988 on promoting b i l a t e r a l cooperat ion . 
I t formed three s ecre tary l e v e l subcommissions to study 
and report matters r e l a t i n g t o water re sources , trade and 
t r a n s i t and economic and i n d u s t r i a l cooperat ion . I t was 
presumed t h a t tremendous e f f o r t s were required to reverse the 
2 growing d e f i c i t of Rs. 3,230 m i l l i o n in Indo-Nepal Trade. 
As the trade and t r a n s i t t r e a t i e s between India and 
Nepal expired on March 23, 1989, a spokesman of the External 
A f f a i r s min i s t ry in New Delhi s a i d t h a t the e x i s t i n g . 
t r a n s i t p o i n t s permitted by India f o r the passage of Nepalese 
goods were not being abo l i shed abruptly even though India 
could c l o s e a l l of them a f t e r the expiry of the t r e a t y . 
The spokesman s a i d t h a t there was no i n t e n t i o n of causing 
discomfor't to the people of Nepal . India assured t h a t the 
s u p p l i e s of e s s e n t i a l commodities such as medicines and 3 baby food would not be a f f e c t e d in the l e a s t . 
1 , CNAS Year Review 1988, Trlbhuwan U n i v e r s i t y , Kathmandu, 
p . 8 5 . 
2 , CNAS, o p . c i t , p .85 
3 , The Times of I n d i a , March 24, 1989 
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India i n s i s t ed on a s ingle treaty for trade and 
t r a n s i t . India also pointed out that Nepal had imposed 
duties on Indian goods and introduced discriminatory 
provisions against these inspi te o£ past assurances. 
India believed that Nepal's budget compounded the offence 
by imposing additional customs duty of 55 percent on 
Indian merchandise while 60 percent discount was offered 
to imports from other countries . According to trade figures 
India imported goods worth Rs. 44.66 crores from Nepal 
in 1987-88. In the f i r s t hhlt of 1988-89, India imported 
goods worth Rs. 15.8 crores from Nepal. Indian exports in 
1987-88 amounted to Rs. 93.41 crores while in April-
September 1988, i t was Rs. 47,29 crores . T i l l the expiry 
of the t r e a t i e s , India used to import as many as 70 indus-
t r i a l products from Nepal which used to get preferential 
entry. These goods included roagnesite. Jute products, refined 
ghee, salseed o i l and hides and skins . 
I t was presumed that India was looking determined 
to subject the 18 mil l ion land locked Nepalese to a l l the 
regions of acute shortages with consequent smuggling, 
hoarding, blackmarket sa les and an a l l round r i se in 
2 p r i c e s . Such punitive treatment of India's policy was 
Jus t i f i ed on the ground that i f the Nepalese were so 
anxious to assert the ir sovereignty, they should not crib 








There were conflicting versions too on the 
question of work permits. India claimed that whereas 4.5 
million Nepalese enjoy the run of this country. Indians 
coald not live in the Himalayan kingdom without 
special permission. The Nepalese defence was that work 
permits were required only for the organised sectors in 
tae Kathmandu. Patan, and Bhawtapur valleys and nowhere 
1 
else. 
TiiB expiry of Trade and Transit Treaties v?ith India 
had adversely affected life In Kathmandu and other towns 
in Nepal. There was an atmosphere of scarcity in the 
Himalayan kingdom. Rationing of Petrol had brought traffic 
in Nepal virtually to a halt, cost of transportation had 
gone up almost 300 percent. ^ Hotels were closed. Vegetable 
and fruit prices had soared. According to one estimate, 
Nepal was incurring a loss of Re 1 crore in Nepalese 
2 
currency everyday. 
According to some experts the tensions in Nepal's 
int.emal political system further aggravated the problems, 
Nepal at that time followed the partyless Panchayat system 
of government; there was therefore, no such thing as an 
opposition. The political groups which claimed to be demo-
cratic and had consistently opposed the Panchayat system 
had been combined. A majority of the local newspapers had 
been reduced to the status of unofficial spokesmen for the 
government. 
1. Ibid. 
2. "Paradise Lost," The Indian Express, May 25. 1989 
3. Ibid. 
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There were two sets o£ "cabinet" in. Nepal. Thje 
better known ministry, headed by the Prime Minister was 
more of an ornamental cabinet. The real power, hovrever, 
did rest with the three senior secretaries in the royal 
palace which used to take most important decisions. The 
political groups which claim to the democratic and have 
consistently opposed the Panchayat system ever since itsx 
in~ception have been banned and here in lies the biggest 
stumbling block in restoring friendly ties and a stable 
relationship with India. It is the result of communica-
tion gap between the people and the ruler of Nepal. 
Notably, the Panchayat system of Government in Nepal had 
rested all powers with the King. The Prime Minister and 
his cabinet members had really no mandate or had little 
choice when it came to taking important decisions on their 
own. Thus, democracy and a Just solution to tl^ie Indo-> 
Nepal problems were inter linked issues. 
Nepal, in response to India's restrictions, had 
decided to opt, in the initial phase of the crisis, for 
the "most favoured nation" treatment instead of the special 
treatment in respect of trade relations with India. Nepalese 
sources conveyed to India that in the changed context 
Nepal would prefer to restructure its relations with India 
on the basis of equality. Nepal accused India of harming 
SAARC spirit. Mr. Shailendra Kumar Upadhyaya, the Foreign 
Minister of Nepal, expressed his view on his way to Harare 
to attend the non-aligned Foreign Ministers Conference, 
that "ever since India Imposed economic blockade, Nepal 
had Introduced a new system for trading with other third 
2 
countries at competitive price. 
1. Ibid. 
2. The Hindu. May 14, 1989 
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Nepal abolished the policy of free convertibility 
of Indian currency. The Nepalase draft proposal on the new 
trade treaty to replace the treaty which expired on March 
23, 1989 said: "all payments and charges in connection 
with trade between the two countries shall, be affected in 
freely convertible currencies in accordance with the 
foreign exchange regulation in force in each country from 
time to time except for the payments in connection >^ ith 
border trade. The draft proposal also said that the two 
countries "shall accord unconditionally to each otlier 
treatment no less favourable than that accorded to any 
third country with respect to customs duties and charges 
of any kind imposed on or in connection with importation 
and exportation at input at export regulations including 
quantitative restrictions," The draft treaty said this 
treatment shall not however apply to the grant continuance 
of any advantage accorded to facilitate border trade. While 
factually it is very difficult to prevent trade at the 
open border. 
This new exchange regulation in Nepal was considered 
another step by Nepal towards ending centuries old people 
2 
to people relationship betv^ een the two countries. It was 
believed that these restrictions would lead to greater 
problems for people living in the border areas. People 
living on either sides of the 1,700 km long border had so 
far received their daily necessities without any difficulty 
going by the then market situation. 
1. The Times of India. August 2, 1989. 
2. CNAS Year Review, 1989 
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It was also assumed that control on easy availa-
bility of the Indian rupee could increase the value of 
the Indian rupee. It could lead to conditions favourable 
for a black market to thrive. In tne past, significantly, 
the Indian rupee was used to pay for smuggled imported 
goods, which were illegally brought from Nepal. The Indian 
currency then returned home through Hawala payments. There 
was reports that massive smuggling of petroleum, oil and 
lubricants took place after the expiry of treaties. 
An analysis of the crisis viewed that "the real 
issue between India and Nepal today is the Kathmandu 
ruling coterie's increasingly clear preference for asseir-
ting their country's independent personality as exemplefled 
2 by the proposal for switching to trade in hard currency. 
It could be presumed to have a clear understanding of. the 
odds facing Nepal, But, it would rather use to break caused 
by the lapse of treaties to reshape the Indo-Nepal relation-
ship. The costs did not matter because their hope is that 
the greater the hardships, the easier it will be erode the 
goodwill of the Nepali people for India. Thus is suggested 
the hidden agenda was to stroke anti-India sentiment by 
exacerbating shortages. 
The treaty of peace and friendship of 1950 appeared 
to be the central issue in this crisis. While the fact is 
that the governments of both Nepal and India did not seem 
1. The Times of India, August 2, 1989 
2. Dilip Mukerjee "Conterie - Nepal Raises the Ante," 
The Times of India, May 30, 1989 
3. Ibid. 
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to b« quite satisfied in their heart of hearts with the 
1950 treaty as it stands with manner in which it being 
observed in actual practice. Both sides have however, 
refrained from expressing their dissatisfaction in public 
with the consequence that a psychological crisis charac-
terised by a lack of mutual confidence at credibility 
has developed between them. 
Nepal raised bilateral issues at international 
forums. Nepal claimed at UN that India suddenly abrogated 
its transit treaty with Kathmandu. That was the first time, 
representatives of the two countries had engaged in a ver-
bal exchange at the UN. India described Nepali charges as 
inaccurate and incorrect. An Indian spokesman describing 
India's policy said that India never believed in raising 
bilateral issues at international forums. By doing this 
Nepal was merely trying to seek publicity of doubtful value 
which seived no useful purpose. India made it clear that 
the treaties had actually expired in March 1988. The 
Draft agreement to review these treaties were only ini-
tiated in October 1988. It v/as, however, perfectly clear 
that the treaties could not be finalised unless Nepal 
fulfilled certain conditions. Since the treaties had 
actually lapsed in March 1988, they had then been extended 
on an adhoc basis for six months. 
Risaikesh Shaha, "Himalayan Impasse : Need for New 
Perspectives," Times of India, June 7, 1989. 
The Times of India, October 8, 1989; also see The 
Statesman, October 1, 1989; TTie Times of India, 
September 29, 1989. 
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CHAPTER " I I I 
THE POLITICAL^_BCONOMIC^AND_STRATrciC_FACTORS_IN_THE 
FORMUIATION_OF_INpiA_^S_POLICY_TOWARDS_NEPAL_-_JA^ 
A n a l y s i s w i t h S p e c i a l r e f e r e n c e t o t h e r o l e of SAARC 
a n d l n d i a ' s -Aftd p o l i c y t o w a r d s N e p a l ) 
A» I m p a c t of Aid 
A new era ushered in the political and economic 
life of Nepal after the revolution of 1950. Foreign and 
played, significant roll In the development of Nepal. 
Nepal has entered into bilateral trade agreements with 
about twenty nations. Treaties with Bangladesh and Pakistan 
including Transit Agreement^Every country has its own 
consideration and compulsions to fulfil the national obje-
ctive and moral obligations. Aid has been un-conditional 
transfer of financial resources and usually the conditions 
attached to aid are clearly and driedly intended to serve 
the Interest. 
Nepal entered into separate transit treaty with 
India. India's aid to Nepal was primarily from strategic 
point of view as well as to facilitate economic development 
to foster political stability and to minimise the influence 
of other countries. 
Similarly, Chinese and Pakistani aid to Nepal was 
with a view to reduce external influence on the Kingdom 
and to enhance their image in the regional context. Nepal 
perceived the friendly presence of China as a potential 
weight to balance the growing tilt towards India. 
nn 
The United S ta te s was extanding economic a id to Nepal 
to f o s t e r p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y and independence of the 
Kingdom, which i t cons idered e s s e n t i a l f o r the evolut ion 
of on l i b e r a l p o l i t i c a l system in Nepal . In a p o l i c y 
s ta tement , the U.S . government dec lared j "our fundamental 
o b j e c t i v e s wi th respec t to Nepal are the maintenance in 
power of a non-communist government, and the continued 
o r i e n t a t i o n of such government towards the western democra-
c i e s as opposed to s o v i e t Russia ," 
After the death of S t a l i n there was a p e r c e p t i b l e 
change in the s o v i e t approach. At the 20th Congress of the 
CPSU in 1956 Khrushchev dec lared Russ ia 's p o l i c y and s a i d j 
"these developing c o u n t r i e s , although they do not belong 
to the s o c i a l i s t world, can draw achievement in bui ld ing an 
independent na t iona l economy and r a i s i n g t h e i r p e o p l e ' s 
l i v i n g s tandards . Today, they need not go begging to t h e i r 
former oppressors f o r modem equipment, they can g e t xt 
from s o c i a l i s t c o u n t r i e s , f r e e from p o l i t i c a l or m i l i t a r y 
2 
o b l i g a t i o n s , " 
Not withstanding Nepal r e a l i s e d the r e s u l t of Foreign 
a i d by India and China and the idea^' behind I t , Foreign 
Min i s t er R . K . Shah s a i d ( " i t i s natural f o r the Chinese 
and Indians to be i n t e r e s t e d in the road connect ing Nepal 
with t h e i r own and each o t h e r ' s t e r r i t o r y . The Indian a id 
f o r the cons truct ion of the Kathmandu Raxaul road (Tribhuwan 
Rajmarg}the Chinese a id and f o r the cons truc t ion of Kathmandu 3 
Kodari Rpad can be e a s i l y expla ined in t h e s e terms*. 
1 , Development of S t a t e P o l i c y Statement with regard to 
Nepal, 28 August 1950 quoted in R , K . Ja in (ed.) US-South 
Asia R e l a t i o n s , 1947-1982, V o l , 3 , Radiant ^Publications, 
1983, p-,181 
2 , Quoted in Robert W.R, American & s o v i e t Aid, New York, 
1972, p.54 
^ a s i n , A.S . (Ed, ) Documents on Nepal 's Relat ions wi th 
India and China 1949-66, New Delh i , 1970 fa. 
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Nepal Wds very w e l l awdre ot the vested Interes^ts 
of the donor ccrtintrtes. Foreign Aid and i t s impl ica t ions 
gave Nepal vigorous s t reng th to dec ide i t s own fore ign 
p o l i c y , c r e a t e s e l f - r e l i a n c e , think about balance of power, 
and the idea for •zone of peace* . 
B. P o l i t i c a l Psyche 
i^epal has i t s own fears and apprehensions. The 
Kingdom was w e l l p laced to understand t h a t the South Asian 
power asymmetry i s such t h a t a l l the geographica l ly sepa-
rated smal l countr i e s cannot match the Indian c a p a b i l i t i e s . 
King Birendra Bir Bikram shah Dev of ^epa l , wh i l e expressing 
the common concern to preserve the independence and s e c u r i t y 
of each country in the reg ion , observed t h a t "the world and, 
above a l l , our own region urgent ly needs a new wisdom capa-
b le of s t r i k i n g a balance between the claim of s e c u r i t y 
and those of bas ic need.** 
Nepal had 'Spec ia l R e l a t i o n s ' wi th India , but a l l the 
time i t i s under pressure to preserve i t s Nat ional i sm. With 
China i t has good r e l a t i o n s but b e l i e v e s in "non in terven-
t i o n and non- in ter ference in the i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of nat ions" 
Nepal was caut ious of China t o o . The King coromentedj "History 
notes t h a t China defeated o t h e r races and was a l s o vanguished 
but, I b e l i e v e the communist government of . . . . . . . . C h i n a 
w i l l take leasons from the History and not adopt the path 
of encroachment upon and i n t e r f e r e n c e in the p o l i t i c a l 
s o v e r e i g n i t y and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y of her neighbours . 
1 . The King^s address to the f i r s t conference of Heads 
of S ta t e s and Governments of the South Asian countriea 
he ld in Dhaka, December 7, 1985. 
2 . Yadunath Khanna, "What Nepal Expects from Neutral 
Summit" (Text of s tatement by the Nepal i Foriegn 
Secretary a t the Belgrade conference ),Gorkhapacra, 
" August 8, 1961 
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China should make a l l possiole efforts not to repeat past 
mis takes • 
For the Nepalese Independent democratic India cons-
t i t u t ed a far greater challenge both po l i t i c a l l y and psy-
chologically. The rulers of Nepal usually have perceived 
India as the more dangerous of I t s neighbour's, China has 
been considered as too dis tant botii in physical and cul tural 
terms to threaten the country's independence but, close 2 
enough to serve as a potent ial source of support. 
While India has 1300 miles open boundry with Nepal, 
Despite a l l differences on many counts i t should watch and 
protect the in te res t s of the Himalayan Kingdom. India has 
promised this role under SARRC a l so . I t , therefore,becomes 
• • • • n t i a i ^ look on SARRC role and i t s implications 
on I n d i a ' s . Foreign policy towards Nepal. 
2 (A) south Asian Association for Regional co»operatlon % 
The charter of the South Asian Association for 
regional co->operatlon reaffirmed i t s determination to 
promote co-operation, adhere to the principles of United 
Nations Charter and Non-Alignment in respect of the pr inc i -
pies of Sovereign equali ty, t e r r i t o r i a l in tegr i ty , national 
Independence, non-use of foix:e and non-interference in the 
in ternal affairs of other s t a t e s . The King of Nepal observed 
in his address to the f i r s t SAARC summit» "After a long 
winter of mistrust , coldness and suspicions this region of 
1. Gorkhapatra, October 7, 1961 
2. Leo E# Rose, Nepal i strategy for Survival, p.278 
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south Asia c e r t a i n l y looks forward to a new spr ing g iv ing 
b i r t h as i t were to an a era of en l ightened s e l f - i n t e r e s t 
based on a coouaon d e s i r e to rep lace c o n f l i c t with coopera-
t i o n to s u b s t i t u t e d i scord with harmony and f i n a l l y , more 
from an a t t i t u d e of s e l f cenderdness to a widening horizon 
of c o n t a c t in the r e g i o n in a s p i r i t of r e c i p r o c i t y , g ive 
and take , l i v e and l e t live**. 
Impl icat ion on Nepal's P o l i c y Dec is ions 
SAARC gave Nepal a common platform to d i scuss 
b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s wi th o ther members of the organ i sa t ion 
€md make out an independent and s e l f - s t y l e d , view on un-
s e t t l e d and unreso lved p]:x>blems and. p r e s s u r i s e the member 
concerned. To b e f t i e n d Pakis tan , Nepal went out of i t s way 
to proclaim i t s n e u t r a l i t y over the Indo-Pak c o n f l i c t s 
even though K i r t i Nidhi Bis ta dec lared h i s country*s 
support to s e l f dete iminat ion in s e t t l i n g the Kashmir i s s u e . 
I t i s revea l ing t h a t out of the seven SAARC n a t i o n s . Nepal 
has been c l o s e on ly to Bangladesh and Pakis tan, both 
fundamental i s t . I s lamic d i c t a t o r s h i p s , and both unfr iendly 
to Ind ia .^ 
2» Other Factors t 
There i s task of d i r e c t p u r s u i t of r e g i o n a l , econo-
mic cooperat ion between the two c o u n t r i e s , because, India 
i s so l a r g e in s i z e and p o t e n t i a l and Nepal r e l a t i v e l y 
so sma l l , t h a t any s e r i o u s t a l k of n e g o t a l t i o n c r e a t e s a 
f ear phychos i s . I t has great e f f e c t a t the mind of i t s 
1 . Address to the f i r s t SAARC Summit o p . c i t . p . 4 . 
2 . The Times of I n d i a , New De lh i , May 31 ,1989 . 
leadezrs. This fear phychosis has led to many changes in 
the policy of Nepal towards India from securi ty perception 
and economic dimension. Nepal feels i t deterrent and hope 
that India must play a posi t ive role to al lay the fears 
of the small neighbours and i n s t i l t r u s t and confidence in 
them. 
The other factor kfeping symbolic effect on the 
changed policy of Nepal af ter 1980 is that Nepal perceives 
tha t India ' s strength is not i t s own since depends on others 
for i t s sophist icated weapons as well as for large aid 
and investment. Other countries feel tha t if India claims 
to be a power on these grounds they can also achieve the 
same posi t ion. This cruel irony has put an end to the years 
old dependence in many matters . The 1962 Chinese attack on 
India added fuel to the f i r e and made Nepal to reconsider 
India ' s c a p a b i l i t i e s . Nepal's foreign policy is based u l t i -
mately on the assumption that China wi l l not m i l i t a r i l y 
challenge New Delhi's dominant pol i t ion to the south of 
Himalayan c r e s t . But« tha t policy has shrunk and Nepal has 
made I t c lear tha t i t i s not possible for i t to compromise 
i t s sovereignity or accept what may be called limited sover-
eignty for Ind ia ' s so cal led secur i ty . 
In addit ion, Indian mi l i ta ry reverses a t the hands 
of the Chinese a l tered the regional balance, and Nepal 
f e l t the need for corresponding modification in i t s regional 
policy. The 1950 defence t rea ty with India and India ' s 
offer to defend Nepal's were important asses t s , but India 's 
mil i tary debacle created a c r ed ib i l i t y gap. China appeared 
a strong and well administered s t a t e . India presented a 
dismal picture of weakrmen, corruption, and i n s t a b i l i t y . 
— 
1. Statement of Prime Minister Kriti Nidhi Bisht in June 
1969 quoted from Leo E.Rose, Nepalt Strategy for Survivals 
op.cit. 
r r-
N e p a l , t h e r e f o r e , d e c i d e d t o do some t h i n g on i t s own t o 
e n s u r e i t s s e c u r i t y v i s - a - v i s C h i n a . 
Nepal r e c e i v e d a g u a r a n t e e from t h e C h i n e s e s i d e . 
This g u a r a n t e e t o o reduced t h e impor tance o f I n d i a i n t h e 
e y e s o f Nepal* The C h i n e s e F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Chen Yi a s s u r e d 
King Mahendra and t h e N e p a l e s e p e o p l e t h a t i f any f o r e i g n 
f o r c e s a t t a c k N e p a l , t h e C h i n e s e p e o p l e would s t a n d on 
2 N e p a l ' s s i d e . 
B) TO r e c a l l , t h e s e e d o f Indo-Nepa l problems were sown i n 
1960 when King Mahendra d i s m i s s t h e d e m o c r a t i c a l l y e l e c t e d 
Prime M i n i s t e r B . P . K o i r ^ l a and o u t lawed h i s p a r t y N e p a l i 
C o n g r e s s . The a l l e g a t i o n a g a i n s t K o i r a l a was h i s f r i e n d l y -
n e s s towards I n d i a . King Birenda was a more a s s e r t i v e 
monarch. B u i l d i n g upon h i s f a t h e r ' s e d i f i c e he t e n d e d t o 
n e u t r a l i s e t h e I n d i a n f a c t o r i n N e p a l i p o l i t i c s by d i s p l a y -
i n g t h e China c o r d . 
C) D i s t u r b a n c e s i n I n d i a ' s N o r t h - E a s t had a n e g a t i v e impact 
on I n d o - N e p a l i r e l a t i o n s r e c e n t l y . A l t h o u g h , Assamese and 
h i l l t r i b a l mov«nents a r e u s u a l l y d e f i n e d as d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t 
B e n g a l i m i g r a n t s , t h e l a r g e B e n g a l i m i g r a n t s r e s i d i n g i n 
t h e f r i n g e a r e a s o f Assam v a l l e y and t h e l o w e r h i l l s of 
N o r t h - E a s t h i l l s t a t e s have a l s o been s u b j e c t e d t o a t t a c k . 
Some o f t h e s e N e p a l e s e - most o f whom a r e t h i r d o r f o u r t h 
g e n e r a t i o n r e s i d e n t s i n I n d i a , and hence I n d i a n c i t i z e n s , 
have found t h e s i t u a t i o n s o i n t o l e r a b l e t h a t t h e y have 
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r e t u r n e d to Nepal as r e f u g e e s . In r e t u r n p o l i t i c a l f r a c t i o n s 
i n Nepal have taken up t h e c a u s e o f t h e N e p a l e s e r e t u r n e e s 
demanding c o u n t e r measures a g a i n s t t h e Ind ian 'migrant* 
1 . Rama Kant , N e p a l ; China and I n d i a , p . 2 0 3 
2 . S e e Rama Kant , o p . c i t , p . 1 9 7 
3 . S tephen P.Cohen, Ed . , The S e c u r i t y o f South A s i a , p . 1 6 
i) n 
coitununity in Nepal. This reac t ion has led to demands in 
Nepal t h a t a l l Indians be required to hold Indian passports 
o r expe l led . 
D) Another cause of d i f ference between the two count r i es 
involves the con t ro l and development of the myriad water 
sys tan t h a t debouch out of the Nepal h i l l s i n to the p la ins 
of I n d i a , Nepal p re fe rs m u l t i l a t e r a l p ro jec t s t h a t have 
m u l t i l a t e r a l funding. India wants b i l a t e r a l p ro j ec t s in 
which t h i r d p a r t i e s a re excluded. 
E) Besides, Nepal decided to opt for 'Most Favoured Nation ' 
t rea tment i n s t ead of 'Specia l Treatment ' in respec t of t rade 
r e l a t i o n s with I n d i a . Nepal was of the view t h a t the Indo-
Nepal 'Spec ia l R e l a t i o n s ' has done more harm than good to 
Nepal and Nepal p re fe r red to r e s t r u c t u r e i t s r e l a t i o n s with 
Ind ia on the bas i s of e q u a l i t y . 
The Governments of both the count r ies showed t h e i r 
concern upon growing but concided t h a t the misleading 
p u b l i c i t y by some Indian NPWS papers aimed a t in t imida t ing 
the Nepalese psyche was not the pol icy of the Government 
of I nd i a , but , i s the handiwork of elements in India which 
do not l i k e the growing f r iendship and understanding between 
the two c o u n t r i e s . 
4. Tci^ of Terms a l t e r Expiry ol Treaty on 23,OJ.1989 s 
Nepal made some t e r r i f changes on April 14,1989 
1. Ibid,, p.11 
2. The Times of India, March 24, 1989 
3. The Hindus tan Times, February 7, 1989, speech by 
Foreign Minister S.K. Upadhyay. 
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which increased discrimination against Indian goods. It 
also decided to have a fresh look at the citizenship of 
6,48 million Nepalese ot Indian origin. The Governinent 
of India took it serlQsly and decided that if Nepal takes 
any action, India could retaliate by considering the cases 
of 5 million Nepalese living in India. 
The Nepal government simultaneously directed foreign 
2 
companies not to anploy Indians. After the expiry of treaty 
on March 23, 1989 there was a feeling of insecurity among 
businessmen of Indian origin. About 25/4 of them acquired 
Nepalese citizenship. It was reported that the Indian currency 
3 
was not being accepted at sirjung. Nepal also notified ban 
on pujTChase of assests by Indians in Nepal. There was a 
large scale discimination and harrassment of Indian citizen. 
Indian professionals were being harrassed and teachers 
were either being eased out or denied wages on the pretext 
of their not having work, permits. Traders were finding it 
difficult to open bank accounts. A small and industrious 
community of the people of Indian *->rigin was being projected 
as a threat to the Nepalese economy. It was all against 
5 
negotation of the 1950 treaty. Anti Indian lobby in 
Kathmandu did not like any Indian Firm and therefore, the 
Nepalese government under pressure abondoned the contract 
than to give it to SIMCO, an Indian Firm. 
Nepal went to the extreme teight and introduced New 
1. The Times of India, April 15, 1989 
2. The Times of India, March 29, 1989 
3. The Indian Express, April 16, 1989 
4. The Times of India, May 11, 1989 
5. The Times of India, May 12, 1989 
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Exchange Regulations abol ish ing the pol icy of c o n v e r t i -
b i l i t y of Indian currency. I t was a fu r the r s t ep towards 
ending cen tu r i e s o ld people to people r e l a t i o n s h i p . Nepa-
l e s e p o l i t i c i a n s were c r i t i c a l of the c r i t i c i s m put forward 
by Indian media and considered i t an in t e r f e rence in the 
i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of t h e i r count ry . 
On Ju ly 1, 1989 the Nepalese government announced 
r e s t r i c t i o n s on the s e l l i n g of the Indian currency. I t 
used every s o r t of p ressure upon India to force her and to 
come to i t s terms, ' but India took a finn s t ep and did not 
y ie ld to the wishes of the Kingdom. The Indian deplomat 
r e l u c t a n t l y denied a l l e g a t i o n s made by Nepal before the 
U.N, panel and asked Nepal to "d ive r t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for 
the problems c rea t ed for the Nepalese people by i t s own 
ACts ."^ 
After the expiry of thr t r e a t y on March 23, 1989 
Nepal economy reached to d i r e s t r a i t s . Development pro jec t s 
Ccune to a h a l t . The export reached to zeix) l e v e l . The 
imports under OGL from t n i r d count r ies emptied the hard 
currency reserves^ compelling the in ter im government to 
impose r e s t r i c t i o n s on 50 percent of non-essen t i a l items 
brought from Hong Kong, Korea, China, japan and some o the r 
c o u n t r i e s . New baggage rules for a r t i c l e s , mostly consumer 
goods and small items brought by t r ade r s by a i r have been 
enfourced. The c o s t s t r u c t u r e went high by 40% Spurious 
1 . The Times of Ind i a , Ju ly 1, 1989 
2. The Times of Ind ia , Novemoer 11 , 1989 
3 . The Hindustan Tiroes, March 23, 1990 
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items were smuggled into Nepal from different points in 
India and sold a t very high pr ices . 
The Government of India took a strong stand. I t 
informed Nepal tha t the existing system of standby loan 
wi l l not be renewed because of change in trade arrangements, 
AS to the responsibi l i ty for the termination of t rea ty , 
India defended i t s posi t ion, i t reitrated- that the relevant 
t rea ty and other arrangements had lapsed for no fault of 
India, and had not been abrogated suddenly or otherwise as 
i l l ega l* The problems of Nepal, in the Indian perception, 
were the i r "acts of commission and ommission". 
As s ta ted ea r l i e r , India c r i t i c i s e d Nepal's treatment 
as i l logica l* India kept open two check posts out of i t s 
15 pos ts . Later real ised Nepal i t s fault and declared; "we 
are approaching the forthcoraming ta lks in a cooperative and 
constructive s p i r i t . We wish to remove by negotiations the 
discriminatory nature of cer tain regulations presently in 
2 force against Indians employed or working in Nepal,** Nepal 
simultaneously declared that i t was deffering indefinetely 
the puzx:hase of Arms from Chinese firms. 
King Birendra re i t r a t ed that a l l issues between 
the two covintries could be resolved through friendly 
negotiations and that i t "'^ as always prepared for friendly 
t a l k s . 
1, The Hindustan Times, June 6, 1990 
2. The Hindustan Times, June 5, 1990 
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TERMINAL OF TREATY 
The 1950 I n d o - N e p a l e s e T r e a t y o f Peace and F r i e n d -
s h i p was prompted by h i s t o r i c a l and g e o g r a p h i c a l compul-
s i o n s of t h e two n e i g h b o u r s . The c o r n e r s t o n e o f t h i s 
u n i q u e t r e a t y i s t h e ' S p e c i a l R e l a t i o n s h i p * which e n j o i n s 
upon t h e two governments t o t r e a t each o t h e r ' s n a t i o n a l s 
a t p a r , and a l l b e n e f i t s a f e g u a r d i n g each o t h e r s n a t i o n a l s 
s e c u r i t y c o n c e r n s . 
The t r e a t y e x p i r e d on 2 3 . 0 3 , 1 9 8 9 , There was a l a s t 
m i n u t e d i a l o g u e between t h e I n d i a n Ambassador i n Kathmandu 
A.R.Dev and t h e Wepalese f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r S.K, Upadhyaya, 
but n o t h i n g s u b s t a n t i a l c o u l d emerge . 
The e x i s t i n g t r a n s i t p o i n t s p e r m i t t e d by I n d i a f o r 
t h e p a s s a g e o f t h e N e p a l e s e goods were n o t a b o l i s h e d though 
I n d i a c o u l d c l o s e them a l l , I n d i a d i d n o t t r y t o c r e a t e 
h a r d s h i p f o r Nepal and t h e s u p p l y of e s s e n t i a l commodi t ies 
remained i n t a c t . Out o f 15 c h e c k p o s t s Raxual and J o g b a n i were 
k e p t open even a f t e r t h e e x p i r y o f t h e t r e a t y , 
I n d i a d e s i r e d t o I n c o r p o r a t e t h e Trade and T r a n s i t 
T r e a t y i n t o one s i n g l e u n i f i e d t r e a t y , but Kathmandu d i d 
n o t a p p r e c i a t e i t and d e c l i n e d t o a g r e e t o New D e l h i ' s 
p r o p o s a l . So much s o Nepal p r e f e r r e d t o s a y goodbye t o 
o l d t r e a t i e s w i t h I n d i a and n e g o t i a t e new ones on t h e b a s i s 
o f ' f r i e n d s h i p ' and ' e q u a l i t y ' , Nepal was d e t e r m i n e d n o t 
t o c o n c l u d e any agreement w i t h I n d i a which i s n o t b e n e f i c i a l 
t o both t h e c o u n t r i e s , 
Nepal t o o k t h i s as an o p p o r t u n i t y t o r e s t r u c t u r e 
i t s economy and i n d u s t r y and s t a n d on i t s own f e e t as an 
i n d e p e n d e n t s o v e r i g n s t a t e . The s t a n d taken by Nepal i n 
1 , The Times o f I n d i a , March 2 4 , 1989 
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ignoring fruitful dialogue and settle the dispute of the 
treaty had a considered and planned consistancy of purpose* 
Nepal was hopeful of. meeting its requirements from other 
countries and get free for ever from Indian interference 
and influence. 
Immediately on the expiry of the treaty Nepali 
trade teams were sent abroad to finalise export deals. 
Agreements for the immediate supply of 7000 tonnes of 
diQsel and Kerosene from Singapore and 4000 tonnes of sugar 
from Bangladesh were clinched in no time, China as a true 
friend also agreed to airlift petrol to Kathmandu. Six 
overland transit and trade points were activated. 
Kathmandu made up its mind to use Karachi for its 
imports instead of India. It was all done on a set pattern 
and in a considered way. India's adversaries thus scored a 
point by alienating a close strategic neighbour from India. 
Katinmandu made it clear that Nepal had not violated the 
1950 peace agreement with India and it will not allow its 
territory to be used to harm any other country. 
Under the treaty Nepal was to give preferential trea-
tment to Indian goods on a reciprocal basis* but Nepal 
levied 250% duty on Indian goods as in the case of other 
imports. Nepal refused to provide any preferential treatment 
to India. 
In response* India suffocated Nepalese economy and 
followed 'big stick policy. These strained bilateral relations 
could only be reversed, when Mr. Bhattari, the P.M. of the 
interim government invited India following the change of 
1. Speech by Foreign Minister of Nepal. The Times of India* 
March 7, 1989 
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government at i^ ew Delhi. The change of government at New 
Delhi and the emergence of government at Kathmandu reversed 
the poce and gradually the relations became harmonial. 
In the course of his visit to Beijing to attend 
the Asian Development Bank meeting in May 1989 the i^ epalese 
finance minister B.B. Pradhan tried to get the Chinese 
leaders to agree to sell oil to Nepal. But thry pointed out 
that the nearest railhedd on the Chinese mainland irom Tibet 
was 800 km away. Moreover, the oil line to Tibet was faulty 
and choked. Nepal was advised to sort out its differences 
with India, China made it clear that the Himalayan Kingdom 
could not look to Beijing as there were tremendous problems. 
The unilateral termination by India of the Nepal 
India Treaty of Trade and Transit had virtually brought the 
Kingdom's economy to a standstill. 
Nepal was compelled to redetermine its policy, recon-
sider and reconcile its actions. Nepal put forward fresh 
proposals to have separate trade and transit treaty to India, 
Nepal desired to review the peace and friendship treaty 
2 
with a view to bringing it in time with the times. But, 
India did not agree to make any change in its proposal for 
unified treaty and charged Nepal with an •open and fla-
grant* violation of the bilateral peace and friendship 
treaty of 1950. 
Nepal could not yet what it expected from her other 
companion countries. There were queues at petrol pumps, 
hotels were closed, export was affected and prices v^ ere 
1. Rising Nepal, May 5, 1989 
2. The Times of India, February 17, 19 89 
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h i k e d t o 25% o r more . A l l d e v e l o p m e n t a l a c t i v i t y came to a 
h a l t and an emergency l i k e t h a t o f I n d i a i n 1975 was 
d e c l a r e d . 
INDO-NEPAL BID TO MEND FENCES t 
The i c e was broken on August 2 5 , 1989 when p . V . 
Narasiroha Rao« t h e the n E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s M i n i s t e r p a i d a 
two-day v i s i t t o Kathmandu and met t h e K i n g . I t was f e l t 
t h a t t h e two c o u n t r i e s were now moving towards a p h a s e of 
s e r i o u s and p u r p o s e f u l d i a l o g u e c o v e r i n g a l m o s t t h e e n t i r e 
2 
gamut o f b i l a t e r a l i s s u e s . R a j i v Gandhi , t h e Prime M i n i s t e r 
of I n d i a and N e p a l ' s k i n g Birendra B ir Bikram Shah Dev a l s o 
met on September 4 , 1989 i n Be lgrade on t h e o c c a s i o n o f 
NAM m e e t i n g . 
A NEW PHASE IN INDQ.NEPAL RELATIONS i 
V . P . S i n g h , t h e Prime M i n i s t e r o f I n d i a announced 
t h e P o l i c y d e c i s i o n o f h i s government afteip coming t o power 
i n 1990 t h a t i t would be h i s endeavour t o n o r m a l i s e r e l a t i o n s 
w i t h a l l i t s n e i g h b o u r s , i n c l u d i n g N e p a l . I t was b e l i e v e d 
a t New D e l h i t h a t t h e 1950 T r e a t y o f Peace and f r i e n d s h i p 
had been under o p e r a t i o n f o r t h e l a s t 40 years but t i m e and 
ag^ in Nepal had f l o u t e d i t . I n d i a i t s e l f must do soine 
i n t r o s p e c t i o n f o r i t s d i p l o m a t i c l a n d f a i l u r e s . I t was f e l t 
t h a t t h i s t i m e an a f f i r m a t i o n would be s o u g h t from Nepal 
t h a t i t would honour i n l e t t e r and in s p i r i t t h e 1950 
t r e a t y and t h e s e c u r i t y and commercia l p a c t s through a w e l l 
1. The Times of India, April 28, 1989 
2. The Hindu, August 27, I9d9; also see "Welcome move". 
Editorial, The Times of India, August 29, 1989. 
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devised and mutually accepted machinery and monitoring 
system. 
It was a landmark in the relations between India 
and Nepal when the i'rime Ministers of India and Nepal, 
V.P. Singh and Krishna Prasad Bhattarai signed a joint 
communique on June 10, 1990. The acrimony and bitterness 
of the past 14 months were over. It took care of their 
major conceims. The trade and transit arrangements, snapped 
on March 23, 1989 were restored. India was relieved by the 
proper understanding and appreciation of its security 
concerns by Nepal and also the promised end of discrimina-, 
tion against its nationals. 
The two sides were prompt with followup administra-
tive measures to implement the decisions incorporated in 
the communique. The reactions in the two countries were 
euphoric. 
The advent of the democratic era in Nepal also 
countributed to the happy conclusion of the talks. It v/as 
for the first time that the Prime Minister, and nott the 
King, committed that country's government to ^ major 
decisions with India. The change exerted a beneficial 
influence on the negotiations and the preceding exchanges 
through diplomatic channels. This was also the first time 
in diplomatic channels that agreed dieis ions were made 
known through a joint communique signed at a press confe-
rence. 
1. The Hindustan Times, March 28, 1990 
2. The Frontline, June 23-July 6, 1990 
6n 
Restoration of Status quo 
India and Nepal decided on June 15,1990 to put 
aside the aberrations of the recent past, normalise rela-
tions fully and resolve status quo anti to April 1, 1987 
in trade and transit arrangements pending the finalisa-
tion of a comprehensive arrangement. The interim government 
of Nepal fully exempted additional customs duty levied on 
all goods imported from India as well as the customs duty 
levied on primary products. 
It was also decided that the two governments will 
take all necessary steps such as issue of administrative 
orders, notifications, legislation/ordinance etc. in order 
to ensure the status quo anti to April 1, 19 87, is restored 
by July 1, 1990 it was agreed. 
On trade and transit, Nepal was fully accommodated. 
The 15 points earlier designated as transit points for 
Nepal's transit trade through India with third countries 
have been reinstated. The 22 border points and the routes 
specified as land customs stations for the movement of 
goods between India and Nepal has been restored. The new 
dispensation was aimed to boost Nepal's exports to India. 
For instance, it was decided that there will be customs-
free and quota-free access for manufacturing items containing 
upto 65% of Nepalese or Nepalese and Indian materials, as 
against 80% in the past. The tariff concession on import 
duty was also provided where the value of Nepalese and 
Indian materials and labour added in Nepal was 40% of the 
ex-factory price. In the past, it was 50 percent. The 
1.^ The Hindustan Times, June 15, 1990 
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standby credit a to Nepal has been enhanced £rom Rs« 25 
1 
crores to Rs. 35 crores* 
^n response, exemption of additional customs duty 
to Indian goods has been restored by Nepal. Indian natio-
nals were exempted from the ambit of the work permit scheme. 
The Indian government, to recall, had taken strong exception 
to the work permit, for Indian nationals. In India, Nepalese 
nationals are treated on par with the locals in employment 
in the private sector or the government, barring the three 
all India-services, and ownership of property, trade and 
business. Likewise India expects the same status and privi-
leges for Indian nationals as the local citizens in Nepal. 
India and Nepal also agreed to usher in a new era of coopera-
tion between the two countries, particularly in the spheres 
of Industrial and human resource development for the harme-
ssing of the waters of the common rivers for the benefit of 
the two peoples and for the protection and management of 
2 
the environment. 
Chandra Shekhar became the Prime Minister of India 
in after the premature fall of the V.P. Singh government. 
He has provided unstinted support to the leaders and the 
people of Nepal in their quest for restoration of democracy. 
He played an inspirational role when the democracy movement 
wa;s oeing launched in Nepal. He had specially come to Nepal 
to attend a Nepali congress convention in December 1989 
and later in February 1990 when a multiparty movement was 
launched for restoration of democratic institutions. 
Chandra Sheker's visit to Kathmandu on February 13, 
1991 when the parliamentary elections of Nepal were very 
1. Ibid, 
2. , Ibid, 
\] 'l 
near gained considerable significance. He sald« speaking 
at a banquet hosted in his honour by the Nepalese Prime 
Ministers "The time has come to put our economic and 
commercial relations on a comprehensive basis •** 
In a significant development, the two countries agreed 
on February 13# 1991 to more gainfully harness their water 
resources potential for the benefit of the people of the 
two countries and to obviate the annual recurring flood-
related losses. India also offered Nepal a trade regime which 
would allow Nepalese goods uninhibited duty free entry into 
India. India also agreed to purchase all the surplus elec-
tricity generated by Nepal. 
It was also agreed that the Indian railway ministry 
vvould examine Nepalese proposals for the upgradation, 
expansion, extension and repair of some delapidated and 
broken railway lines in Nepal. India also showed readiness 
to assist Nepal in building the physical and intitutional 
infrastructure for industrialisation and htiman resources 
development. Chandra Shekhar expressed his views **we, on 
our part, must also fully appreciate that in helping Nepal, 
we are helping ourselves, there is nothing that would give 
more satisfaction to the people of India than the happiness, 
2 prosperity and progress of the people of Nepal." 
The Nepali Congress secured a mandate in the 
Pratinidhi Sabha elections held in May 1991. Girija 
Prasad Koirala, the new Prime Minister of Nepal, is now 
1. The Times of India, February 14, 1991 
2. Ibid 
3. Pratinidhi Sabha is the Parliament of Nepal, 
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the complete master of his government's affairs. He will have 
to take full responsibility fc-r his policy decisions^ both In 
the domestic and international spheres.The Nepali Congress bellaves 
that common rivers between Nepal and India should be jointly 
harnessed for mutual benefit. He has tremendous fund cf gcodvrill 
in India. Indian policy makers assumed that she will cooperate 
with India without flaunting a China card which had often in ths 
past created misunderstanding in New Delhi, There is every hopa 
of the two countries prompting the bonds of friendship further on 
the basis of equity and fairplay. 
Indo-Nepal ties have been put on a stronger foundation as 
a result of the Prime Minister, P.V, Narasimha Rao's three day 
visit to Kathmandu from Oct. 19, 1992. As was evident from the 
version of his Nepalese counterpart. Prime Minister Girja Prasad 
Koirala and the Nepalese media, Rao's trip to Nepal proved 
fruitful.What the two Prime Ministers did seem to have acconipllshed 
in their Summit Meeting in Kathmandu was to cut through the 
logjam of political sensibilities and address the issue of trade 
and terrorism, which figure of either end of the spectrum cf 
bilateral relations in a business like manner* 
On October 21, 1992 India and Nepal formalised a series cf 
measures to expand bilateral cooperation, enhance Nepalese 
exports to India on liberalised terms and harness the immense 
water resource potential for the mutual benefit of the t"70 
countries. The joint communique issued at the end of the thrae 
day visit of Rao stated that the fresh economic package marked 
a watershed in trade relations between tVie two countries. 
Further, a number of issues related to trade have also 
been settled to facilitate Nepalese export to India including 
the settlement of the, movement of Nepalese private commercial 
vehicles from the Nepalese boarder to Calcutta/Haldia and back. 
1. Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 22.10,1992. 
69 
In addition. Nepal was allowed to import goods from 
Indiajfi by payment in freely convertible currency alongv:ith 
the existing system of payment in Indian rupees, Indi:in 
exporters were also provided the facility to make exports freely 
in convertible currency and the benefit of exports permissible 
in India, 
Indo-r^epill Ji^^lH. 
-| n». Ciotca T 
^* ^(ov \ V 1 
-'AS- regard"to the Standby credit, the joint comrpinicfo.e 
said that the Government of India had agreed to enhance th3 
amount from Rs. 35 crores in Indian currency to Rs. 50 crorss. 
The term of agreement was also extended from one year to three 
years and the concession in interest @ 7 percent per annuin 
2 
was maintained. 
Policy regarding joint ventures was also revised. Joint 
ventures were provided to adopt simplified procedure as appli-
cable in India together/ With the system of certificate of 
origin system to deplore the exports to India and to provide 
employment opportunities to local Nepalese. 
Both sides agreed to a time-frame for investigation and 
preparation of Project Rep>orts on the Karnals, Panchaswar, Sapta 
Koshi, Buri-Gandak, Kamal and Bagmati Projects. 
The policy adopted by the two Prime Ministers hslped 
Koirala in stablishing his beleagured 18-month old ministrypth^ 
Kingdom's first democratically elected government in throo 
3 decades. 
The visit of Indian Prime Minister to Nepal was more to 
build bridges than to drive hard-bargains. It was evident.. 
2. The Hindustan Times^ 21,10,1992. 
3, The Times of India, New Delhi, 22.10.1992. 
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in his cautious manoeuvres over the sharing of water 
resources. Instead of pressing home, India's advantages 
over the Tanakpur barrage, Rao aides agreed to donate 150 
cusecs of water to Nepal and Double the amount of free hydel 
power. 
The visit of the Indian Prime Minister to Nepal opened 
new dimensions in bilateral relations and developed a sense 
of confidence between the two countries. It demonstrated a 
significant shift in the Indian foreign policy towards Nepal 
It signified the recent trends adopted towards Nepal and 
the lines to be adopted in future. 
n 
C O N C L U S I O N 
Conclusion 
There .'.-' a clearly discernible pattern emercing in 
India's relations with its neighbours in the recent pact. 
While the equation with Pakistan remains a category f,n itself, 
characterised by persisting acrimony and apprehensions, the 
relations with all other neighbours, including China and 
Nepal, have started looking up, 
Thore were question marks lingering over Indo-Nepal 
reactions two years ago. But both the Nations did cre^ l.lt^ blo 
spadework in clearing mutual doubts and prepared ground for 
a cooperative and harmonions relationship in the recent past. 
These recent understanding symbolise the will cf the 
government of India to live together with Nepal in em"!.fcy 
and goodwill. Trade and transit treates which unforti-,nat"ly 
generated much controversy and tension in th3 past will turn 
into a crossroads of friendship between India and Nepal-, 
Today, Nepal also started realising that a democractic 
leadership which had to respond to the needs and wishas of 
Nepal's teeming thousands living in object poverty could 
not afford to have irritating and acrimonions relationship 
with India particularly so since strategic equations In 
the world at large and south Asia in particular vjere under-
going significant changes. Extra regional powers, Inclrding 
the united states and china, were not interested in isolating 
or containing India in the region with the help of smaller: 
neighbours. Besides, the post cold war international economic 
environment was becoming harsher, comp-elling countries of 
the poorer regions to find new possibilities of cooperatic;7 
and common responses to global changes. 
Today, it is a world literally coming apart and 
reshaping itself, VHiere ideological bareriers are crunbl.'^ .ng 
n 
maps are being redrawn, and power equations being re^ .^ .l^ .ton., 
Vihere old friends are no longer strategic allies end i\''pc:co 
super-powers, no more rivals, are fevarish.ly forging sup?-r 
alliances. It is a world where Indian policy^maJcero hi"/-
to quickly unlearn old wisdom and move ahead« 
The current phase of Indo~Nepal rG.lations e.lso r-r^ i^c?--
tes that Nepal needs most India in a rapidly changing vrorld^  
It is widely shared that India has a certain manosuvrobility 
in this region. It is infact, because of mutually sharsrl 
strategic perceptions and needs that decision makers .^.n 
both countries have played down the recent irritaits, 7ov 
the moment, India's policy towards Nepal is to ignou'? tr'5 
disagreements and more on regardless. India's policy cViC°?3 
to emphasise the positive rather than the divisi've f.antovn.^ 
India and Nepal have a long history of special frio-y"-
ship, Nepal's economy is largely dependent on Inciie ancl ::r:dia 
has also economic interests in Nepal, It reflects la i-.h'-
Trade and Transit and Peace and friendship treaties, ri^ .ccl 
and modified consistently; sometimes with tempera^-- snte.rjonJ.rT. 
These treaties, in fact, were prompted by historical and c;?C" 
graphical compulsions of the tv;o neighbours. The trer.-is; 
between the two made the two government responsible to treat 
each others nationals at par, and all benefit safeguarding 
each others nation's security concerns. 
India's policy towards Nepal has consistently b-^ rn 
aimed to keep Nepal away from being especially linked '.;;' Kh 
external powers, including China, and to assist Nepal 
achieving political and economic stability, India has played 
a key role in Nepal's domestic affairs, it played e decisive 
role in bringing down the reign of Hanas, It actlv^ .ly assis-
ted Nepal in recorganisation of her administrative structure 
particularly in respect of police force and curbing the 
border terrorism. But, domestic unstability of Nepal and 
n 
China's expansionist policy during tl^ e 60s and 70s sometimes 
broughit Nepal and China closer, India's policy has been 
understandably sensitive to it, 
China being an immediate neighbour of Nepal, India's 
policy profile always remained high in Nepal, The Indo-
Nepal relations, therefore, assumed disturbing dimensions 
during Sino-India conflict. Nepal remained neutral during 
the conflict. The conflict, infact, had shifted the power 
balance in favour of China that could only be balanced after 
the Indo-Pak war in 1971 that established India a major power 
in the region. The regional balance of power, therefore, is 
permanently meaningful for the Indo-Nepal relations. 
In fact, foreign policy in practice, rarely corresponds 
fully to its broad statements of aim and principles. It is 
based on calculations and compulsions of the national interests 
In the specific circumstances in which the decisions are made 
and actions are taken, India's policy always desired to incor-
porate Trade and Transit Treaty into one single unified 
treaty. Nepal declined which led to strained relations with 
India first in 1971 and second in 1989 after the expiry of 
the treaties respectively. 
The policy postures of the Rajiv Government towards Nepal 
after the expiry of the treaty was hard and led the mutual 
relations the most hostile. India's big-stick' policy vir-
tually imposed economic blockade of Nepal, It suffocated 
Nepal's economic life. But after the 1990 visit of Mr. K.P. 
Bhattarai following the change of government at New Delhi, 
the Indo-Nepal relations gradually reversed. At the moment 
the mutual relations are in quite good shape. 
Nepal has liberalised its economy, allowing 100 
percent foreign investment in big medium scale industries. 
JD 
The government of Nepal Is also encouraging Indian jo^ ~, 
ventures and mutually beneficial projects on a governmo 
to government basis. For example, the 120 MW Tanokpjx- p'-•'* 
plant supplies power to Nepal and irrigates 5,000 h3C'-r.rr J 
of Nepali land. Nepal, further, awarded the contract for 
extension of the Tribhuwan International Airport- ':n .r-'-'l-
instead of China, 
China has always been a major factor in the fomr.^ '" - -
tion of India's policy towards Nepal, The improving 3i.^'^-
Indian relations also softened India's policy pasture u 
Nepal. Beijing's recent attitudes confirm its process.'.'-^ " 
that it is keen on maintaining a peaceful environs-'t '"r 
that it can get on with its goal of rapid GNP grcta c 
thorough going modernisation of the economy. 
India too is compelled to have a fresh look * '; Itg poll-
calculations in the region. After the collapse of th3 Sovlec 
Union and chances in the socialist world, the theatre "^f 
international conflicts have virtually shifted from E.^ ropa to 
Asia, The Asian countries are still underdeveloped and tr-a-
pped in several bilateral and internal strife. The vu " ti~ 
polar world that we are going to have will have its cvm mano-
euvrability in this region that Indian decision-makers CT 
not ignore. Such a shift makes it imperative for India to 
seek more effective ways to meet the challenges in a nev/ 
region, obviously, India has to play a leading roxe in the 
regional politics. India, therefore intended should have a 
strong military and industrial base as well in the region, 
India's policy is in search of new political initiacives that 
can be best suited to its national interest. 
In this respect, the emergence of democracy in Nepal 
is a good sign for India. In the realm of practical politics 
matters concerning power are easier said than done. The 
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democratic government happens to be more responsive • to 
a betterw?y 'rlth the India's regional compulsions, 
Nepal cen now stride beyond its tragic pest ai-:d .look 
for a better fuji'ture, A cultural renaissance is sweeping 
the country. After decades of imposed silence thsre is a 
bourst of creative energy. 
We are heading for an interdependent v.'orldc Mshru's 
words seem to be true even today that laid the fc^ndation 
of India's foreign policy. He said, "We believe that r>:?r.c2 
and freedom are indivisible and the denial of fre'adcra any-
where must endanger freedom elsewhere and lead to conflict 
and war. v;e are interested in recognition in theory ard in 
practice of equal opportunities for all races. inO.'a ?>:i';.ll 
always work for one world in which there is co^cp^ratici 
among all people". 
There is no doubt that the ice has melted in Indo-
Nepal relations and that there is forward movement towards 
cooperation and harmony. But the road co consolidating this 
hopeful atmosphere and the gains are bound to be difficult. 
A great deal of patience and prudence on both the sides will 
be required to put the bilateral relations on a footing 
where they are free from day-to-day fluctuations in the 
political mood on either side. 
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Treaty of Peace and Friendship between The Goveimment of 
India and The Government of Nepal 
THE GOVERNMENT of India and the Government of Nepal, recogni-
zing the ancient ties which have happily existed between the 
two countries for centuries; 
Desiring still further to strengthen and develop these 
ties and to perpetuate peace between the two countries; 
Have resolved therefore to enter into a Treaty of Peace 
and Friendship with each other, and have, for this purpose, 
appointed as their plenipotentiaries the following persons, 
namely, 
THE GOVEE?NFENT OF INDIA 
HIS EXCEELENCY SHRI CHANDRESHWAR PRASAD NARAIN SINGH_. 
AMBASSADOR OF INDIA IN NEPAL '^0^ ^ '^'^^ti 
THE GOVERNMENT OF NEPAL 
MOHUN SHAMSHER JUNG BAHADUR RANA, 
MAHARAJA, PRIME MINISTFR AND SUPREME 
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF NEPAL, 
who having examined each other's credentials and found them 
good and in due form have agreed as follows : 
Article 1 
There shall be everlasting peace and friendship between the 
Government of India and the Government of Nepal. The two Govt^tn-
ments agree mutually to acknolwedge and respect the complete 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of each 
other. 
Article 2 
The two Government hereby undertake to inform each other 
of any serious friction or misur\derstanding with any neighbour-
ing State likely to cause any breach in the friendly relations 
ACCNo. V^ j 
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subsisting between the two Governments. 
Article 3 
In order to estnblish and maintain th*^  roliiLions refer rfi-d 
to in Article 1 the two Governments agree a to continue 
diplomatic relations with each other by means of representatives 
with such staff as is necessary for the due performance of their 
functions. 
The representatives and such of their staff as may be 
agreed upon shall enjoy such diplomatic privileges and immu-
nities as are customarily granted by international law on a 
reciprocal basis: Provided that in no case shall these be less 
than those granted to persons of a similar status of any other 
St^te having diplomatic relations withi either Government. 
Article 4 
The two Governments agree to appoint Consuls-Genera1, 
Consuls, Vice-consuls and other consular agents, who shall 
reside in towns, ports and other places in each other's terri-
tory as may be agreed to. 
Consuls-General, Consuls, Vice-Consuls and consular agents 
shall be provided with exequaturs or other valid authorization 
of their appointment. Such execpiatur or authorization is liable 
to be withdrawn by the country which issued it, if considered 
necessary. The reasons for the withdrawal shall be indicated 
whereever possible. 
The persons mentioned above shall enjoy on a reciprocal 
basis all the rights, privileges, exemptions, and immunities 




The Government of Nepal shall be free to import, from" or 
through the territory of India, arms, ammunition or warlike 
material and equipment necessary for the security of Nepal, 
The procedure for giving effect to this arrangement shall be 
worked out by the two Gtovernments acting in consultation. 
Article 6 
Each Government undertakes, in token of the neighbourly 
friendship between India and Nepal, to give to the nationals 
of the other, in its territory, national treatment with regard 
to participation in industrial and economic development of such 
territory and to the grant of concessions and contracts relating 
to such development. 
Article 7 
The Government of India and Nepal agree to grant, on a 
reciprocal basis, to the nationals of one country in the 
territories of the other the same privileges in the matter of 
residence, ownership of property, participation in trade and 
commerce, movement and other privileges of a similar nature. 
Article 8 
So far as matters dealt with herein are concerned, this 
Treaty cancels all previous Treaties, agreements, and engage-
ments entered into on behalf of India between the British 
Government and the Government of Nepal. 
Article 9 
This Treaty shall come into force from the date of 
signature by both Governments. 
•si) 
Article 10 
Tliis Treaty shall remaiP in force until it is terminated 
t)y either party by giving on^ year's notice. 
Done in duplicote at Kathmandu this 31st day of July,1950. 
NARAIN SINGH 
For the Government 
of India 
JANG BAHADUR RANA 
For the Government 
of Nepal. 
i 
Treaty of Trade and Transit Between The Government of India 
And 
His Majesty's Government of Nepal 
WHEREAS THE Government of India and His Majesty's Government 
of Nepal (hereinafter referred to as the Contracting Parties). 
Being animated by the desire to strengthen economic co-
operation between the two countries, and convinced of the 
benefits likely to accrue from the development of their economies 
towards the goal of a Common Market. 
Have resolved to conclude a Treaty of Trade and Transit 
in order to expand the exchange of goods between their respective 
territories, encourage collaboration in economic development 
and facilitate trade with third countries. 
They have for this purpose appointed as their plenipo-
tentiaries the following persons, namely, 
THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA 
HIS EXCELLENCY SHRI HARISHWAR DAYAL, AMBASSADOR OF INDIA 
IN NEPAL 
HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT OF NEPAL 
HIS EXCELLENCY SHRI RAM NARAYAN MISHRA. MINISTER FOR 
COMMERCE & INDUSTRIES 
who, having exchanged their full powers and found tho»m good 
and in due form, have agreed as follows : 
T R A D E 
A r t i c l e 1 
The contracting Parties shall promote the expansion of 
mutual trade in goods originating in the two countries and 
shall to this end endeavour to make available to each other 
u 
commodities which one country needs from the other. The 
contracting parties shall further take care to avoid to the 
maximum extent practicable diversion of commercial traffic 
or deflection of trade. 
Article II 
Subject to such exceptions as may be mutually agreed 
upon, goods originating in either country and intended for 
consumption inthe territory of the other shall be exempt from 
customs duties and other equivalent charges as well as from 
quantitative restrictions. 
Article III 
Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions, either contracting 
Party may maintain or introduce such restrictions as are necessary 
for the purpose of 
a) protecting public morals, 
b) protecting human, animal and plant life, 
c) safeguarding national treasures, 
d) safeguarding the implementation of laws relating to the 
import and export of gold and silver bullion, 
e) safeguarding such other interests as may be mutually 
agreed upon. 
Article IV 
Payment for goods and services between the two countries 
will continue to be made as heretofore. 
Article V 
The trade of the contracting Parties with third countries 
shall be regulated in accordance with their respective laws, 
rules and regulations relating to imports and exports. 
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Article VI 
Payment for transactions with third countries will be 
made In accordance with the respective foreign exchange laws, 
rules and regulations of the two countries. The Contracting 
Parties agree to take effective steps, in co-operation with 
each other, to prevent infringement and circumvention of the 
laws, rules and regulations of either country in regard to 
matters relating to foreign exchange. 
T R A N S I T 
A r t i c l e VII 
dbods intended for import into or export from the terri-
tories of either contracting party from or to a third country 
shall be accorded freedom of transit through the territories 
of the other party. No distinction shall be made which is based 
on the flag of vessels, the place of origin, departure, entry, 
exit, destination or ownership of goods. 
Article VIII 
Goods (including baggage) shall be deemed to be in transit 
across the terrltoxry of a contracting party when the passage 
across such territory, with or wit out transhiptnent, warehousing, 
breaking bulk or change in the mode of transport, is only a 
portion of a complete journey beginning and terminating beyond 
the frontier of the contracting party across whose territory 
the traffic passes. Traffic of this nature is termed "traffic 
in transit." 
Article IX 
Traffic in transit shall be exempt from customs duty 
and. from all transit duties or other charges imposed in respect 
of transit, except reasonable charges for transportation and 
8 1 
such other charges as are commensurate with the costs of 
8ervi<^ es rendered for the supervision of such transit. 
Article X 
The procedure to be followed for traffic in transit to or 
from third countries is laid down in the Protocol hereto annexed. 
Except in case of failure to comply with the procedure pres-
cribed, such traffic in transit shall not be subjected to 
unnecessary delays or restrictions. 
Article XI 
Traffic in transit through the territories of one contra-
cting party from one place to another in the territories of the 
other party shall be subject to such arrangements as may be 
mutually agreed upon. 
G E N E R A L 
A r t i c l e XII 
Nothing in this Treaty shall affect any measure which 
eitheB of the Contracting Parties may be called to take in 
pursuance of general international conventions to which it is 
a party or which may be concluded hereafter relating to the 
transit, export or import of particular kinds of articles such 
as opium or other dangerous drugs or in pursuance of general 
conventions intended to prevent infringement of industrial, 
literary or artistic property or relating to false marks, false 
indications of origin, or other methods of unfair competition. 
Article XIII 
The contracting parties shall take appropriate measures 
to ensure that the provisions of this Treaty are effectively 
and harmoniously implemented and to consult with each other 
§5 
periodically so that such difficulties as may arise in its 
implementation are resolved satisfactorily and speedily. 
Article XIV 
This, Treaty, which replaces the Treaty of Trade and 
Commerce between the two countries of 31st July, 1950, shall 
come into force on 1st November, I960, It shall remain in 
force for a period of five years. It shall continue in force 
for a further priod of five years thereafter, subject to such 
modification as may be agreed upon, unless terminated by 
either party by giving notice of not less than one year in 
writing. 
Done in duplicate in Hindi, Nepali and English, all the 
texts being equally authentic, at Kathmandu on the eleventh 
day of September, one thousand nine hundred and sixty, corres-
ponding to the twenty seventh day of Dadra, Bikram Sambat two 
thousand and seventeen. In case of doubt, the English text 
will prevail. 
(Sd.) HARISHWAR DAYAL (Sd.) RAM NARAYAN MISHRA 
For the Government of Government of Nepal 
India. 
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Text of the Treaty of Trade and Transit Between India and 
Nepal - 1971 
The contracting parties sha l l promote the expansion 
and d ivers i f i cat ion of inutual trade in goods originating in 
the two countries and s h a l l to th is end endeavour to make 
avai lable to each other commodities which one country needs 
from the other. 
Both the contracting parties sha l l accord unconditionally 
to each other treatment no l e s s favourable than that accorded 
to any third country with respect to (a) customs duties and 
charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with importation 
and exportation, and (b) import regulations including quan-
t i t a t i v e r e s t r i c t i o n s . 
Notwithstanding the provisions of Art ic le II and subject 
to such exceptions as may be made af ter consultation with 
His Majestry's Government of Nepal* the Government of India« 
with a view to providing the primairy producers of Nepal 
access to the Indian market, agree to exempt from customs 
duty and quantitat ive res tr ic t ions such primary products as 
are produced in Nepal and imported into India. 
Notwithstanding the provisions of Art ic le l i and subject 
to such exceptions as may be made af ter consultation with 
His Majesty's Government of Nepal, the Government of India 
agree to promote the industrial development of Nepal through 
the grant on the basis of non-reciprocity, of spec ia l ly 
favourable treatment to imports into India of industrial 
products manufactured in Nepal in respect of customs duty 
and quantitative res tr ic t ions normally applicable to them. 
1 
with a view to f a c i l i t a t e greater interchange of goods 
betweei the two countries . His Majesty•& Government sha l l 
endeavour to exempt, wholly or p a r t i a l l y , imports from India 
from customs duties and quantitat ive res tr ic t ions to the 
maximum extent compatible with the ir development needs and 
protection of the ir industr ies . 
Payments for transactions between the two countries' w i l l 
continue to be made in accordance with the ir respective 
foreign excheuige laws, rules and regulations. Ihe contracting 
parties agree to consult each other in the event of e i ther 
of them experiencing d i f f i c u l t i e s in the ir mutual transactions 
with a view to resolving such d i f f i c u l t i e s . 
The contracting part ies 'agree to co-operate e f f ec t ive ly 
with each other, to prevent infringement and circumvention 
of the laws* rules and regulations of e i ther country in 
regard to matters re lat ing to foreign exchange and foreign 
trade 
Itie contracting parties sha l l accord to "traffic in 
transit** freedom of t rans i t across the ir respective terri« 
tor ies through routes mutually agreed upon. Each contracting 
party shal l have the right to take a l l indispensable measures 
to ensure that such freedom, accorded by i t on i t s terr i tory, 
does not in any way infringe i t s legit imate interests of 
and kind. 
The term •'traffic in transit** means the passage of goods 
including unaccompanied baggage across the terr i tory of a 
contracting party when the passage i s a portion of a complete 
journey which begins or terminates within the terr i tory of 
the other contracting party. T^e transhipment, warehousing 
breaking bulk and change in the mode o£ transport of such 
goods as wel l as the assembly« disassembly or reassembly 
of machinery and bulky goods sha l l not render the passage 
of goods outside the def init ion of "traff ic in transit* . 
provided any such operation i s undertaken s o l e l y for the 
convenience of transportation. Nothing in this Art ic le shal l 
be construed as imposing an obligation on e i ther contracting 
party to es tabl i sh or permit the establishment of permanent 
f a c i l i t i e s on i t s terri tory for such assembly* disassembly 
or reassembly. 
• 
Traffic in trans i t shal l be exempt from customs duty 
and from a l l t rans i t duties or other charges except reasonable 
charges for transportation and such other charges as are 
commensurate with the costs of services rendered in respect 
of such t r a n s i t . 
For convenience of t ra f f i c in treinsit, the Government 
of India agree to provide at point or points of entry or 
e x i t , on such terms as may be mutually agreed upon and 
subject to relevant laws and regulations prevail ing in India, 
whrehouses or sheds for the storage of t rans i t cargo awaiting 
customs clearance before onward transmission. 
The procedure to be followed for t r a f f i c in trans i t to 
or from third countries i s l a i d down in the protocol hereto 
annexed. Except in case of fa i lure to comply with the pro. 
cedure prescribed, such t r a f f i c in trans i t sha l l not be 
subject to avoidable delays or r e s t r i c t i o n s . 
yg. 
Passage of goods £zoin one pXace to another In the 
t err i tor i e s of one contracting party through the t err i tor ie s 
of the other party sha l l be subject to such arrangements 
as may be mutually agreed upon. 
The freedom of trans i t sha l l apply to goods recfuired 
by each contracting party and to goods avai lable for export 
from that party# but sha l l not extend to the products of the 
other contracting party. Subject to such exceptions as may be 
mutually agreed upon, each ontracting party sha l l prohibit 
and take e f f e c t i v e measures, and co-operate with the other, 
to prevent. 
(A) Re-exports from i t s terr i tory to thizd countries of 
goods imported from the other contracting party and products 
which contain materials imported from the other contracting 
party exceeding 50 percent of the ex-factory value of such 
products t 
(B) Re-exports to the terr i tory of the other contracting 
party of gooda imported from third countries and of products 
which contain imports from third countries exceeding 50 
percent of the ex*-factory value of such goods. 
In order to enjoy the freedom of the high seas , merchant 
ship s a i l i n g under the f lag'of Nepal shdl l be accorded, subject 
to Indian laws and regulations, treatment no l e s s favourable 
than that accorded, to ships of any other foreign country 
in respect of matters relat ing to navigation entry into and 
departure from the ports , use of ports and harbour f a c i l i t i e s , 
as well as loading and unloading dues, taxes and other 
l e v i e s , except that the provisions of th is Art ic le sha l l not 
emtend to coasting trade. 
9^ 
Notwithstanding the foregoing provis ions, e i ther 
contracting party may maintain or introduce such re s t r i c -
tions as are necessary for the purpose of (A) protecting 
public morals; (B) protecting human, animal and plant l i f e ; 
(C) safeguarding national treasures; (D) safeguarding the 
implementation of laws relat ing to the import and export of 
gold and s i l v e r bull ion; and (E) safeguarding such other 
interes ts as may be mutually agreed upon. 
Nothing in th i s treaty s h a l l prevent e i ther contracting 
party from taking any measures which may be necessary for 
the protection of i t s e s sent ia l security interests or in 
pursuance of general international conventions* whether 
already in existence or concluded hereafter, to which i t i s 
a party relat ing to t rans i t , export or Import of particular 
kinds of a r t i c l e s such as opium or other dangerous drugs or 
in pursuance of general conventions intended to prevent 
infrizjgement of industr ia l , l i t erary or a r t i s t i c property 
or relat ing to f a l s e marks, f a l s e indications of origin or 
other methods of unfair competition. 
'Axe contracting parties sha l l take appropriate measures 
to ensure that the provisions of th i s treaty are e f f ec t ive ly 
and harmoniously implemented and to consult with each other 
periodical ly so that such d i f f i c u l t i e s as may arise in i t s 
implementation are resolved s a t i s f a c t o r i l y and speedi ly . 
This treaty sha l l come into force on the f i f teenth day 
of August 1971 1971 and sha l l remain ai in force for a period 
of f ive yeairs. I t may be renewed for a further period of 
f i v e years by mutual consent, subject to such modifications 
as may be agreed upon. 
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Done in d u p l i c a t e in Hindi , Nepal i and Ehglish 
languages a l l the t e x t s being equal ly a u t h e n t i c , a t 
Kathmandu on the t h i r t e e n t h day of August one thousand 
n ine hundred and seventy -one . corresponding to the twenty-
e ighth day of Shravana, BiXram Samvat two thousand and 




Agwani, M.S., and Aswani Ray, South Asia : Stability and 
Cooperation, Centre for Research in Rural and Industrial 
Development, 1983, 
Baburam, Acharya, "Relations of Nepal with China and India, 
r.athmandu. 
Bhattacharjee, G.r., India and Politics of Modern Nepal, 
Calcutta, 1970. 
Bhasln, A.S., Ed., Documents of Nepal's Relations with India 
ahd China, 1949-66. New Delhi, 1970. 
Bindra, 3.S., India And Her Neighbours ; A Study of Political, 
Economic and Cultural Relations and Interactions, Deep 
and Deep Publications, 1985, 
Bista, D.B., People of Nepal, Kathmandu, 1967. 
Chaudhurl, K.C, Anglo-Nepalese Relations, Calcutta, 1960, 
Chauhan, R.3., The Political Development in Nepal, 1950-70, 
Associated Publishing House, New Delhi, 1971, 
Chopra, Surendra, Ed., Studies in India's Foreign Policy, 
Amrltsar, 1980. 
Department of Publicity Ministry of Information and Broad 
Casting, Fing Mahendra's Proclamation, Speeches and 
Messages. 
Dhar, Pannalal, India And Her Neighbours, South Asia, Publishers 
New Delhi, 1991. 
Dutt, V.P., India's Foreign Policy, Vani Educational Books, 
New Delhi, 1984. 
93 
Ferdinand E,, okada. Preliminary Report on Regional Developtnent 
Areas In Nepal, National Planning Commission, Kathmandu, 
July. 1970. 
Gupta, Anuradha, Politics in Nepal, A Study of Post Rana 
Political Development and Party Politics, Bombay 1964, 
Gupta, Bhabani Sen, South Asian Perspectives ; Seven Nations 
In Conflict and Cooperation, B.R, publishing Corporation, 
Delhi. 1988. 
Gupta, M.G., Indian Foreign Policy ; Theory and Practice, Y.K. 
Publishers, Agra, 1985, 
Haksar, P.N., India's Foreign Policy and Its Problems, Patriot 
Publishers, New Delhi, 1989. 
Hussain Noor, The Security of South Asia, Delhi, 
Indo-Nepal Joint Communique Text. 
Jain, Girilal, India Meets China in Nepal, Asia Publishing 
House, 1959. 
Joshl, Bhuwanlal, Democratic Innovations in Nepal, A Case Study 
of Political Acculturation, University of California 
Press, Berkeley, 1966. 
Kual, T.N., India and Asia Ambassadors Need Not Lie, vol, 3 
K. Rangaswami, Indo-Nepal Relations, 1961. 
Kaushik, Surendranath, Majahan and Ramakant, India and South 
Asia, South Asia Publishers, New Delhi, 1991, 
Kumar, Satish, Documents on India's Foreign Policy, Macmillan, 
New Delhi, 1977. 
Lok Sabha Debates, Relevant Issues. 
9i 
Longer, v., The Defence and Foreign Policies of India, Sterling 
Publishers, New Delhi, 1988. 
Mansingh, Surjeet, India's Search for Power. 
Mishra, P.K., India, Pakistan, Nepal and Bangladesh, Sandeep 
Prakashan, Delhi, 1979. 
Mullik, B.N., The Chinese Betrayal, New Delhi, 1971. 
Muni, S.D,, Foreign Policy of Nepal, National Publishing House, 
New Delhi, 1973. 
Narayan, Shriman, India and Nepal ; An Excercise in Open 
Diplomacy, Orient Longman, 1971. 
Nehru Jawaharlal, India's Foreign Policy, Selected Speeches. 
New Delhi. 
Nepal Council of Applied Economic Research, Nepal a Profile, 
Kathmandu, 1976. 
pant, S.D., Foreign Policy of Nepal, National Publishing House, 
1973. 
Permanand, The Nepal Congress in Exile, Delhi, 1978. 
Ramakant, Nepal-chlna and India, (Nepal-China Relations). 
Rasgotra, M. et. al., eds., India's Foreign Policy in the 1990s, 
Patriot Publishers, New Delhi, 1990. 
r^ ose, E Leo and Margaret Vf. Fisher,The Politics of Nepal, 
Cornell University Press, ITHACA And London, 1970. 
Rose, E Leo and Margaret W. Fisher, Nepal Strategy for 
Survival, London, 1971. 
Shumshree, Pushupati, J.B. Rana, India and Nepal ; The Political 
Economy of a Relationship. 
95 
Shrestha, B.P,, An Introduction to the Nepal Economy; 
Kathmandu. 
Shriman Narain, India and Nepal, An Exercise In Open Diplomacy, 
Bombay, Popular Prakashan 1975. 
U.P, Adhlkarya, Some Aspects of Nepalese Economy, Kathmandu, 
1971, 
JOURNALS AND NEWSPAPERS : 
1. Asian Recorder 
2. Amrlt Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, 
3. Commoner, Kathmandu, 
4. Frontline, Madras, 
5. Indian Journal of Political Science, 
6. Indian Journal of Politics, AMU, Allgarh, 
7. Mainstream, New Delhi, 
8. Nepal Recorder, New Delhi, 
9. News Review on South Asia, New Delhi, 
10, The Hindu, Madras and Gurgaon, 
11, The Statesman, New Delhi, 
12, The Times of India, New Delhi, 
13, The Hindustan rimes. New Delhi, 
14, The Daily Telegraph, London. 
15, The Indian Express, New Delhi, 
16, The Motherland, Kathmandu. 
